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	DCI Report: The Rise of UBL and Al-Qa'ida And the Intelligence Community Response	
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	Scope Note  This document was prepared by the CIA's Director's Review	
	Group to assist the DCI in his review of the central issues related to the war on terrorism and the September 11, 2001 attacks.	
	;	
Intro	luction	
	September 11 brought the fight with international terrorism home to ca in the most vivid way. But, the Intelligence Community (IC), and the FBI we y fully engaged in this war many years before September 11.	re
	• The IC did not discover terrorism suddenly on September 11, 2001.	
agend Comm	The growing terrorist threat to US citizens and facilities worldwide—ing in the United States—has been at the top of the Intelligence Community's a for many years. This Report lays out a nearly decade-long record of Intelligence nunity involvement in fighting terrorism and particularly Usama Bin Ladin and hida network.	
ai-Qa	<ul> <li>It is a record of keen awareness of the threat, disciplined focus, and persiste efforts to track, disrupt, apprehend, and ultimately bring to justice Bin Ladi and his lieutenants and dismantle al-Qa'ida. It is also a record of consistent efforts to warn policymakers of the seriousness of the al-Qa'ida threat.</li> </ul>	n
The E	arly Years: Terrorist Financier (1986-1996)	
	Bin Ladin gained prominence during the Afghan war for his role in the recruitment, transportation, and training of ethnic Arabs who fought ide the Afghan mujahedin against the Soviets during the 1980s. At age 22, Bin	1
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Ladin dropped out of school in Saudi Arabia and joined the Afghan resistance almost immediately following the Soviet invasion in December 1979. His money and his experience as a frontline fighter enhanced his reputation.

Bin Ladin had drawn on his family's wealth and donations from sympathetic merchant families in the Persian Gulf region, to organize the Islamic Salvation Foundation, or al-Qa'ida ("The Base"). The foundation maintained recruitment centers and guesthouses in several Middle Eastern countries and organized and funded paramilitary training camps in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

 Under al-Qa'ida's auspices, Bin Ladin also imported heavy equipment to build roads, tunnels, caves, hospitals, and storage depots in Afghanistan for use by the mujahedin and, eventually, to form part of his terrorist infrastructure.

The Afghan experience was key to radicalizing Bin Ladin and cementing his dedication to Islamic extremist causes. It provided him with an opportunity to make and strengthen contacts with a wide variety of Islamic extremists of various nationalities. Many of the men who became key members of the al-Qa'ida leadership met and fought alongside him in Afghanistan against the Soviets.

- It is also at this time that Bin Ladin began perverting the teachings of Islam and the Prophet Mohammed for his own violent purposes. And it is then that he began to exploit underlying social, political, and economic discontent and widespread resentment of the West in many parts of the Muslim world.
- In a 1988 press interview, he claimed, "I felt it a sign from God to battle all opponents of Islam when a mortar shell that landed a few feet away from me did not explode." Urged on by fervent Islamic radicals, he began using his personal fortune to shelter and employ hundreds of militant, stateless "Afghan Arabs" and train them for *jihad* or holy war around the world.

Although Bin Ladin returned to Saudi Arabia to work in his family's construction business after the Soviets left Afghanistan in early 1989, he continued to support militant Islamic causes and radicals who by then had begun redirecting their efforts against secular and moderate Islamic governments in the region. He began publicly criticizing the Saudi Government and harshly condemned the Gulf War and the presence of US and other Western forces in the Arabian Peninsula.

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	Saudi officials say they seized his	passport from 1989 to 1991	for attacking		
	the Al Saud	They revoked his citiz	enship in 1994.		
	Bin Ladin came to the att	ention of the CIA as an emer	aina terroriet		
threat	during his stay in Sudan from 1991 to 1		ging terrorist	1	
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hnoina	During his five-year residence with jihad under the umbrella of al-C	ence in Sudan, Bin Ladin cor	nbined		!
memb	ers of the ruling Sudanese National Isla	mic Front, he embarked on so	everal business		
ventur Afgha	es that probably multiplied his fortune.  n war veterans	<u>His workforce in Sudan incl</u>	ided militant	]	
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		Ladin and al-Qa'ida financeo		J	
extrem West	uists who opposed secular and moderate Following are several examples of what	Islamic governments and wi	10 despised the		
time re	egarding al-Qa'ida's activities from Sud	an:			
	Islamic extremists who in Decemb	er 1992 bombed a hotel hous	ing US	•	
		Bin Ladin financed their grou		•	
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•	Bin Ladin sent members to Somalia ppposing US	
	forces sent there in support of Operation Restore Hope. Bin Ladin later publicly claimed responsibility for this activity	
adding the busy of the second	publicly claimed responsibility for this activity	
•	We believe his experience in Somalia played a significant role in molding his	-
	perceptions of the United States. He has publicly said the US withdrawal from	
	Somalia demonstrated that Americans were soft and the United States a paper tiger that could be more easily defeated than the Soviets had been in	
· ·	Afghanistan.	
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	Qa'ida had attempted to acquire material that could be used to develop a	. 1
L	Qa ida nad attempted to acquire material that could be used to develop a	

chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) capability  CIA's assessment of Bin Ladin during the early 1990s was that he was a major terrorist financier. The IC viewed him largely as a financial supporter of other terrorist groups and individuals, not as the center of a separate organization or network focised on carrying out terrorist attacks on the United States. Moreover, he was only one of a number of potential terrorist threats and, at that time, not considered the most important. As such, the Bin Ladin-al-Qa'ida target competed for resources with other targets  Bin Ladin's morninence grew during the latter part of his residence in Sudan in the mid-1990s  Ladin had grown significantly.  1996 our awareness of the threat represented by Bin Ladin had grown significantly.    Stabilishment in late January 1996 of an "Issue Station" within the DCI Counterterrorist Center (CTC) to focus on the "the Sudan-based terrorist financier Usama Bin Ladin."			
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soon provided intel	ligence revealing a broader	and more pernicious terr	orist capability	
inat reached well b	eyond financial activity.		information on	
	Sudan, indications of al-Qagyptian terrorists.	a'ida's role in terrorism, a	nd Bin Ladin's	
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Presider	Bin Ladin's	s connection to the assassi Ethiopia in 1995	nation attempt on	1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1. 1
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	lemonsi o	organization bent	on attacking t	ne United Sta	tes.		ě	¬ · · ·	
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		acquiring CBR	N materials to	produce wea	pons of mass de	struction.			
			By the time Bir	ı Ladin left Sı	idan in 1996 and	relocated him	self		
	substantia	rror network to A	Afghanistan, th	e Intelligence	Community had	l gained a		÷.	١
	try to stop	him.	- Lander -	. · · · -	1 - Pither				ŀ
•	•	CIA focused m	inte tegniitaes	on him by one	ating in January	1006 a Bin I	din	•	-
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	The Taliban Sanctuary Years: Evolving into a Strategic Threat (1996-2001)	
	CIA efforts to track Bin Ladin's whereabouts continued	
	even during the transition period of his relocation from Sudan to Afghanistan.	
		The second second
		in an including a
	At the time, there was insufficient evidence to indict him in the United States and issue a US warrant.	
	for his arrest.	
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	If any doubts remained about the emerging threat to the	
	United States represented by Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, they were gradually dispelled by	y a
	series of declarations he issued from his refuge in Afghanistan during the 1996-1998	Carlos Ca
	timeframe.	
	<ul> <li>In an undated interview in Afghanistan published in July 1996 in the Lond</li> </ul>	on:
	daily The Independent, Bin Ladin declared that the killing of Americans in	the
	Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia in June 1996 marked the beginni	ng
	of the war between Muslims and the United States.	
	• One month later, in August 1996, Bin Ladin, in collaboration with radical	
	Muslim clerics associated with his group, issued a religious edict or fatwa	in.,
	which he called "Declaration of War" authorizing attacks against Western	
	military targets on the Arabian Peninsula.	
	<ul> <li>Eighteen months later, six months prior to the 1998 US Embassy bombing</li> </ul>	s in
	East Africa, al-Qa'ida issued another fatwa—under the banner of the "Wor	dd
	Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders"—stating that all Mus	lims
	have a religious duty "to kill Americans and their allies, both civilian and military" worldwide.	alikoli (den) ere periodi erre erre erre erre. Herekoliken erre erre erre erre erre erre erre e
	Service of the control of the contro	
	During a subsequent media interview, Bin Ladin explained that all US citi.	zens
	were legitimate targets because they pay taxes to the US Government.	
	By the time of the 1998 East Africa bombings, al-Qa'io	la -
	had established its intention to inflict high casualties and a modus operandi emphasizi	ng
	careful planning and exhaustive field preparations, which Bin Ladin saw as a prerequ	site.
	for the type of spectacular operations he had in mind.	$\mathcal{L} = \{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \end{array} \} = \{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \end{array} \} = \{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \end{array} \} = \{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} \end{array} \} = \{ \begin{array}{c} \mathcal{L} \\ \mathcal{L} $
	The state of the s	tion
	<ul> <li>For example, when asked in a November 1996 interview why his organiza had not yet conducted attacks in response to its August fatwa statement, B</li> </ul>	in
Advention on the	Ladin replied, "If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have !	een
	easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires	
1	qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires a	(OOO)
	preparation."	
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	By early 1998, CIA knew that we were dealing with a	
	sophisticated terrorist organization bent on causing large numbers of American	in the state of th
	casualties. The Bast Africa bombings in August 1998 and the attack on the USS Cole in	
	October 2000 succeeded because of al-Qa'ida's meticulous preparation and effective security practices.	The state of the s
	<ul> <li>CIA analysts looked at al-Qa'ida targeting studies and training materials captured around the time of the East Africa and USS Cole attacks. They published an in-depth intelligence study of al-Qa'ida's terrorist operations th revealed that much of the terrorists' advance planning involved careful, patient, and meticulous preparation.</li> </ul>	lat
	This included extensive surveillance and the preparation of casing studies th	iat in
	detailed the vulnerabilities of potential targets. In the case of the US Embass	i <b>y</b>
•	in Nairobi, for example, the terrorists' casing study was prepared in 1993, five years before the attack	ve:
	years before the attack	
	The analysts also pointed out in the same in-depth study of al-Qa'ida method	
	• The analysts also pointed out in the same in-depth study of al-Qa ida method conscious o	
	operational security.	
	We were also becoming increasingly concerned—and	
	therefore warned about—al-Qa'ida's interest in acquiring chemical and biological	
CONTRACTOR OF STREET	weapons and nuclear materials.	
	• In a December 1998 interview, Bin Ladin called the acquisition of these	
	weapons a "religious duty" and noted, "How we would use them is up to us."	**************************************
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			ressed his concern abou	
	growing lethality, soph	istication, and wide-ra	nging nature of the terro d to its most "awful extr	rist come by
	employing weapons of	mass destruction." DO	CI Tenet made similar w	arnings
			e pointed to Bin Ladin's emical weapons for an a	
	against US facilities.			
	Non	e of Rin Ladin's and	ıl-Qa'ida's extensive ter	moriet
plotting, r	lanning, recruiting, and	training in the late 199	Os would have been pos	sible
without th	e Taliban sanctuary in A	fghanistan.		
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	terrorists since the 1980	Os, the Taliban aided E	in Ladin by	
		permi	itting him to build and m	aintain
			h efforts by the internatic cted him in June 1998 fo	
	for a worldwide "holy v	war" against US citize	ns.	
weeks as				
became so	Since Mething akin to Terroris		and its aftermath, Afghaintry with a vast infrastru	
camps and	facilities for the refuge,	training, indoctrination	n, arming, and financing	
or mousan	d of Islamic extremists f	rom all over the world		
•	It provided Bin Ladin a			ment to
	oversee his organization	i s worigwige tenons	acuviues.	
			nt to fight in <i>jihads</i> in Ka	
	normal lives or migrate	to other countries, the	heir homes to resume the y constituted a ready sup-	oply of
	manpower for terrorist of pattern.	operations. Two of the	9/11 hijackers followed	this
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	The al-Qa'ida-Taliban training camps forme	ed the
for a second	oundation of a worldwide network by sponsoring and encouraging Islami	c extremists
The state of the s	om diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological, logistical, and pe	rsonal ties.
<b>医三种类的</b>	received basic training in the us	e of small arms
	and guerrilla tactics mand specialized training in subjects such as explosives, poisons	nore advanced
	assassination techniques.	
		The first of the second of the
	Bin Ladin emphasized indoctrination in extremist religious idea	es and included-
	the constant repetition that the United States is evil and that the	current
	regimes of Arab countries are not true believers in Islam and shoverthrown as a religious duty.	ould be
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_8(	In summary, what Bin Ladin created in Afghanistan was a liversary	sophisticated
Ť	he IC's Efforts to Track, Disrupt, and Bring Bin Ladin to Justice	
	The Strategy	
	are in the our negy	
	By 1998, the key elements of the CIA's stratical and t	tegy against
	in Ladin were emphatically offensive rather than defensive. They include	<b>d:</b>
	Hitting Bin Ladin's infrastructure;	The World Control of the Control of
	Working with liaison to break up cells and carry out arrests;	The state of the s
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	<ul> <li>Pursuing a multi-track approach to bring Bin Ladin himself to j including working with liaison services, developing a close rela</li> </ul>	
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baseline review or the CI plan, CTC produced a ne	In the spring of 1999, in response to the DCI's request for a A's operational strategy against Bin Ladin and a new strategic was comprehensive operational plan of attack against the Bin side and outside Afghanistan.	
Launt-ai-Qa lua target in	side and outside Arghanistan.	
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	The Plan emphasized in its multifaceted program	
the priority of capturing a	and rendering to justice Bin Ladin and his principal lieutenants.	DA BELLEY OF THE STATE OF THE S
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program to ga	ther the intelligence to be able to track and act against Bin Ladin	<u> </u>
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	Another element of the strategy that emerged in 2000 and 2001 was the use of the Predator unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)
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	this central, Afghanistan-focused
	strategy was played out against the necessity for aggressive and complex efforts to disrupt planned Bin Ladin-sponsored terrorist operations on a worldwide basis, which diluted the focus on Bin Ladin himself.
	diluted the focus on Bin Ladin himself.
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	<ul> <li>Responding to the Millennium threat, the attack or of indications of planned terrorist actions during R months leading to September 11 worked to shift the</li> </ul>	n the USS Cole, and the rash Ramadan 2000 and the he focus of operational effort
	away from internal Afghan operations.	
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	CIA submitted a revised strategic counterterrorism to the NSC Staff in December 2000 that won	proposal on ild have significantly
	expanded our activities	
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·····	It was too late for the departing Clinton administra	ution to take action on this
	strategic proposal, however.	
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C05374781 TOP SECRET The Intelligence Community Role The was freeze di Up to this point, this paper has focused on CIA's role in developing our understanding of the al-Qa ida threat and devising and implementing a robust and wellfocused program and strategy to counter it. We now turn to a critical aspect of the overall counterterrorism effort—the broader Intelligence Community role. CTC has aggressively pursued inter-agency representation, both in line management and at the working level, since its establishment in 1986. Over the years, this emphasis has fostered both improved communications as well as begun to break down the often-cited cultural institutional barriers to creative and effective support and joint operations. By 2001, the Center had representatives from more than a dozen agencies involved in the fight against terrorism-10 percent of the Center's personnel complement at that time. FBI officers were detailed there nearly at its inception in 1996, with their representation growing CIA operations officers served at FBI headquarters prior to September 11, CTC detailed to the FBI, and there is CIA representation FBI's Joint Terrorism Task Forces CIA also has assigned officers to work with FBI to assist them in establishing their own foreign intelligence reporting and analysis capabilities From the mid 1990s on, the Center has had officers detailed from NSA, while NSA—in addition to hosting working level CIA officers—had until recently a senior CIA Directorate of Operations officer serving As CTC ramped up its efforts against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida, the relationships and institutional structures that developed over the years among Community agencies paid enormous dividends in the fight with the terrorists. What follows are a few of the more significant examples: Marie Barrier and Arthrech (e.g., 1988). TOPSECRET

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	emphasis on criminal investigations and
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instances where cooperation could be better. The long been abundantly clear.  When problems do occur, it is the resulting different objectives, different tradecrainterpersonal rapport.  FBI and CIA worth the first World Trade Center bombing.	ve been numerous successes and some e need for us to work better together has sult of different organizational cultures, aft, and in some cases a lack of
instances where cooperation could be better. The long been abundantly clear.  When problems do occur, it is the resulting different objectives, different tradecreating interpersonal rapport.  FBI and CIA worth the first World Trade Center bombing.	ve been numerous successes and some e need for us to work better together has sult of different organizational cultures, aft, and in some cases a lack of ked closely together in the aftermath of

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		Maria Mariana Maria Maria
	FBI and CIA collaborated closely or	the TWA 800 case.
	After the crash, CTC immediately formed a working group to assist	t the FBI and other
	gencies in the investigation.	
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	·	AREAN AND
		. W. 18.
	FBI and CIA cooperated closely on a	countering terrorist
T.	reats in 1998.	
	After we received a rash of reports in 1998 threatening:  States Transport of the Property of the Propert	attacks in the United
	States, we worked together to provide advisories for loc agencies.	al law enforcement
	One such episode occurred after	114 4 4 6 11 40
	1998 to hijack a plane on the eastern coast of the United	a plot in the fall of  States to attempt to
	free the "blind Shaykh" from prison	
	<ul> <li>CIA and FBI participated with other agencies in NSC-cl Counterterrorism Security Group to discuss this reportir</li> </ul>	haired meetings of the
	it.	
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Also in 1998, FBI and CIA worked closely togeth	or in the
wake of the East Africa hombines to disrunt a planned attack against our Embass	TV
그 그는 병을 기다니다.	
CIA and FBI also worked closely and successfully	
defeat the suspected Millennium plots and several other cases in 2000.	
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Since	9/11. the two agencies have made collaboration and
cooperation against terrori	9/11, the two agencies have made collaboration and sm a key objective.
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	Despite this excellent record of collaboratic continue. A major, ongoing concern is FBI's own internal diss	semination system. CIA
	officers still often find it necessary to hand-deliver messages to	to the intended recipient
	within FBI. In addition, FBI has not perfected its FI reporting field communication, so dissemination of intelligence outside	system and neadquarters- of FBI still is spotty
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	In some cases, CIA and FBI cou	Add Company to the second of t
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	The different organizational cult CIA sometimes get in the way of desired results. The FBI focu	uses on gathering evidence
	to solve crimes and CIA focuses on threat assessments and col	llecting and analyzing
	intelligence. When these two goals compete, problems have oc	curred.
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	A 2000 CIA Inspector General (IG) report on CTC		,
	concluded that many improvements had been made and that relationships between CIA and FBI had been institutionalized		
	Nevertheless, the IG report also		
	pointed to continued problems that pernaps might be impossible to overcome fully because of "the natural tension [that] exists between the two organizations, deriving from		
	their different missions, which can be negotiated but never eliminated." Some of the most		
	salient difficulties cited by the IG were:		
	The difference in organizational mission intelligence collection and Covert		
	Action for the Agency and successful prosecutions of terrorists for the FBI.		
	The loss of potential intelligence opportunities because of deference to law		
	enforcement goals.		; .
	Concerns in both organizations about access to the other's mission critical	•	
	information.		
	Nonetheless, the leadership of the two agencies have		
	consistently worked these issues and will continue to do so as we identify them.		
	• For example, the assignment of top-flight personnel to significant positions at	vity of	
	the headquarters level of the two agencies has substantially improved		
	coordination.		i
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CIA will continue to move to correct problems and make pro	gress in
closing the gap between where we are and where we want to be. Progress in raising	g the
level of cooperation among the Community agencies over the years has been key warning policymakers and stopping and disrupting attacks against US interests ov	erseas.
brothant DDF lamit on the day of the state o	m CIA
without FBI input on the domestic nexus of international terroris analysts would have been hard-pressed to provide threat warnings in ea	rly
August 2001 that al-Qa'ida continued to view the US homeland as a hi priority target.	gh
Working With Foreign Liaison	
Working closely with foreign liaison partners has been an indisp	engable
part of CIA's counterterrorism strategy before and after September 11	OHSHU19
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	missiles again	nst targets in Sudan	and Afghanistan ir	response to clear		
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	near Khowst i	in Afghanistan. Altl	nough we believe t	hat we damaged se	everal of	
	the intended to	argets in Afghanista	in and killed or inj	ured approximatel	y 80	
	terrorists, Bin	Ladin escaped iniu	rv. possibly warne	a m advance of the	e attack,	
		nber 1998, military				And the second
	increasingly in movements	merested in our trib	aı Algnan sources'			
				ed concern about o	ůr –	
		reporting being re	tiable enough for	locational data,	<u>Consideration of the Constant</u>	
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C05374781 TOP SECRET ultimately policy officials decided the risks of collateral damage to a nearby mosque were too great to call in a strike. In February-March 1999, military contingency planning on a strike against Bin Laden focused on hunting camps used by UAE princes Following policy official discussions with the UAE about the presence of its military C-130s in the area in early March, the camp UBL reportedly had visited-Shaykh Ali's Campwas dismantled. In May 1999, the military again contemplated a cruise missile strike against Bin Ladin in the Qandahar area we intensely tracked and reported on Bin Ladin's whereabouts for almost a week from May 13-19. Again, the military was concerned about the precision respect to identification of particular buildings as well as potential collateral damage to surrounding facilities, resulting in policy officials not authorizing a strike. **Budget and Resources** The IC's war with al-Qa'ida in the decade prior to September 11 did not come cheaply. In a period when overall funding for the Intelligence Community and the Agency showed little if any actual growth, CIA's CBJ requests to the Congress for counterterrorism funds more than For a number of these years the overall annual appropriation included substantial supplementals. These TOPSECRET

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	While this growth r	nattern was clearly favo	rable, the fact that it rested	
	significantly on sup	plemental appropriatio	ns and other emergency me	
•	increased the diffici	ulty in program plannir	<b>1g.</b>	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
		nstrate a steady growth	n in positions targeted again	st
	terrorism			
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- Marie - Mari	indicates that despite the down		onnel resources were alloc IC in general during the 199	
	series of DCI's worked aggress	sively to provide an en	hanced level of effort again	st this
	increasingly dangerous and sor	onisticated target.		
	(C//NF) In the decade p Community experienced a sub-		eptember 11, the Intelligen	
	This reduction began in the wa	ke of the demise of the	Soviet Union and continue	xd well
	into the <u>mid-1990s</u> , reaching it reduced	s nadir in 1999. Overal	Community resources we resulting i	
	substantial decrease in case off			
	reductions of analysts and supp	ort personnel.		र स्ट्रिक्ट के अञ्चलकार है। जिस्सी है के प्रतिकार के लिए हैं। कुरियोक्ट के प्रतिकार की किस्सी के लिए हैं।
			th this resource-constrained	
	Cold War environment by prio PDD 35. But at the same time	it continued to face nev	y demands from the policy	
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MUST CREDIT INTELWIRE.com ww.intelwire.com ≈C05374781 creation of new bureaucratic entities that drew on CIA expertise and staff personnel. Indeed. CIA had to contend with the resource demands of several emerging or heightened threats and events including: Mounting concern over proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This issue moved sharply to the forefront as concerns arose over the lack of security of former Soviet WMD stockpiles, aggressive efforts by Iraq, Iran, and North Korea to develop these weapons and their means of delivery and, at the end of the decade, the emergence of India and Pakistan's nuclear tensions. The Gulf War (C//NF) The reduced supply of personnel and expertise and rising demand for support to policy makers and war fighters sharply constrained our ability to shift personnel resources within the Agency to address these new and shifting priority concerns. Our flexibility was further reduced by the very substantial time it takes to recruit, train, and develop the expertise of both analysts and case officers. (C//NF) In this constrained environment, a series of DCI's nonetheless saw to it that the personnel resources committed to the counterterrerism effort was not only protected but actually enhanced the depth of the Community draw down, personnel positions within CTC grew despite percent reduction in personnel Agency wide. (C//NF) With respect to the analytic effort, in 2001 across the Agency were making analytic contributions to the counterterrorist mission in a variety of ways, such as traditional analysis, targeting, and operational support. dedicated to al-Qa'ida. The equivalent of were working terrorism-related issues or applying specialized skills to the terrorism problem from their positions in the DI, in addition After September 11 those numbers rose dramatically. The total analytic presence in CTC

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		We are using all of the traditional this goal and are using new means of getting	
• .	operational means available to accomplish at this difficult target	this goal and are using new means of getting	
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<u> </u>						analyzing		
	terror fin	ance trends, working all source information	with the US	s policy and law	enforcement	communities, a	nd	
·	uuiizing	an source informatio	<u>n</u>					
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	. •	Identified al-Qa'id	a's growing	interest in cash	couriers and t	rusted hawala		
		networks as vehicl	es for transfe	ming runds in t	ne Middle Eas	st and South Asi	a	}
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	사용한 교육 용제 제공원 시간 전쟁이 되었다. 사용 원인의 회사 회사 회사 및 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관 기관	
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	Integration of Collection	
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l 	has been a key element in our ability to learn about and operate against the terrorists.	j
	In undertaking this integration effort, the ADCI for Collection convened daily	
	meetings with analysts and collection officers from NSA, NGA, and CIA to	
	develon a collaborative collection effort	
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	a. Through focused collection, we were also to build a more complete michage of	
	Through focused collection, we were able to build a more complete picture of	1
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•	This integrated intelligence collection effort also supported military targeting	
•	operations prior to September 11, including the cruise missile attack against	
<b>Proposition</b>	the al-Qa'ida training camp complex in northeastern Afghanistan in August 1998; in addition, it helped to provide baseline data for the US Central	
	Command's target planning against al-Qa'ida facilities and infrastructure	
1	throughout Afghanistan.	
	Following the September 11 attacks, the IC redoubled its	
	efforts to collect and integrate all of the intelligence disciplines.	
. · <u> </u>	This information,	
	ability to locate, track, and support US military operations against al-Oa'ida and Taliban	
	THE PARTY WAS TO SEE THE PARTY OF THE PARTY	
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C05374781 Community collection officers meet daily to ensure focused and dynamic collection on Bin Ladin and residual al-Qa'ida leadership. Warning and Analysis Our analysts assessed al-Qa'ida's modus operandi, capabilities, and intentions to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Similarly, they warned policymakers during the summer of 2001 that the threat of terrorist attacks was real and serious. Such performance was the result of significant measures by the Directorate of Intelligence to enhance our analytical capabilities assigned to this target. After the East Africa bombings in 1998, Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were the target against which we arrayed Each analyst was responsible for the full range of tactical and strategic work, each bearing responsibility for supporting senior policymakers, operations, longterm research, current intelligence, briefings, targeting, and more. In reality, however, most analysts were consumed by tactical work. We needed to get the right balance between strategic and tactical analytical work by giving more effort to strategic analytic issues. CIA therefore created a Strategic Analytic Unit in July 2001 to fix this problem The Unit allowed us to isolate the analysts assigned to it from the grind of daily crises to focus on the bigger picture. TOPSECRET

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•	In addition, during 2000 and 2001, we engaged in a full-scale effort to push our analysis into the broadest possible circulation
nning rent i ng pl	Many of these steps contributed to our analysts' warning during the of 2001 that Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida were engaged in intensive operational and preparations against US interests. We documented the increased threat in intelligence products such as the President's Daily Brief (PDB) and the SEIB, oots in the Arabian Peninsula and Europe. Four current intelligence pieces only stand out.
•	On June 29, 2001, our analysts published a piece in the SEIB entitled "Terrorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real" which concluded that recent indications of near-term attacks were not part of a disinformation campaign, but were consistent with other reporting and public statements by Bin Ladin.
•	A June 30 SEIB article entitled "Bin Ladin Plans High Profile Attacks,"  al-Qa'ida operatives expected their next round of attacks to have dramatic consequences.
	Another SEIB article, on July 25, noted that, although one Bin Ladin attack had been delayed for a few months, preparations for other, near-term attacks were still underway.
	A SEIB article on August 7, 2001, "Bin Ladin Determined to Strike in US," underscored Bin Ladin's desire to conduct terrorist attacks in the US homeland. It noted that the Millennium plot to bomb the Los Angeles airport might have been Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to strike in the United States. It pointed out that al-Qa'ida members—xincluding some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could aid attacks.
	The interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, through CTC's nity Counterterrorism Board, also issued several threat advisories during the
uner	of 2001.
	In addition to the analytic effort done in CTC, analysts from across CIA's rate of Intelligence contributed to the counterterrorism mission by doing zed work on topics such as
	the financial flows that enable terrorism

C05374781 **Covert Action Authorities** By 1998, the IC knew that in Bin Ladin we were dealing with more than a "terrorist financier" and that in al-Qa'ida we were dealing with a sophisticated and determined global terrorist organization that represented a serious threat to the security of Americans at home and abroad. As such, the CIA's strategy against this threat became emphatically offensive Memoranda of Notification (MONs) signed by the President during the 1990s escalated over time the scope and intensity of covert activity against al-Qa'ida but also set boundaries around what the Agency could and could not do. Indeed, although these MONs provided broad authorities to render Bin Ladin, they also gave rise to persistent concerns within the Agency about the legal and

C05374781 procedural limits they placed A December 24, 1998 MON for the first time authorized the use of lethal force in offensive operations designed to capture Bin Ladin spelled out the parameters within which lethal force would be aumonzed, restrictions remained in force in all sunsequent victivs juthorities being approved were in keeping with Executive Order 12353, and that any rorceful measures did not constitute assassination but were legal under the US definition of self-defense. Their implementation also was subject to constraints regarding the risks for collateral damage A MON of February 999 authorized the CIA to work with the Afghan Northern Alliance commander Masood against UBL A December 999 MON **Operations** Armed with these specific authorities, constraints, and guidelines, the CIA between 1998 and September 11 pursued a multi-track approach to TOP SECRET

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	bring Bin Ladin to justice and destroy al-Qa'ida. It involved building up our HUMINT	
	and technical collection capabilities, working with foreign liaison services and friendly	
ſ	local groups—including Northern Alliance commander Masood	
	Operational planning for a capture and rendition operation of	
	Bin Ladin	
	viay 1998 an operational plan to use a mencily rocal urosa group in	_
A	Atghanistan to capture Bin Ladin and turn him over to US officials.	1
	• The operational proposals were discussed with the White House in May 1998.	:
	The plan also was discussed with other principals, but CIA did not formally	
	submit the plan for approval because we assessed the chances for success as low.	
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	low.	
•	During the same general time frame  Prince Turki, the	}
	Saudi Director of General Intelligence, to pressure	
•	the Taliban to expel or deport Bin Ladin.	1
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	In the end, this initiative did not pan out, but	
	given the potential loss of life involved in other plans, we chose to await its outcome.	
i		<b>v.</b>
	In the wake of the East Africa bombings three months later, a	
	similar plan to use the friendly tribal group to capture Bin Ladin was forwarded to and approved by the President in the form of the August 1998 MON. Its authorities, as noted	
	earlier, were expanded in subsequent MONs. The following actions were initiated under	
	this authority.	
	<ul> <li>September 1998 - Afghan tribal assets initiated a search and rendition operation in their area of influence. Efforts by this group continued until 11</li> </ul>	
₹	Sep 2001 without significant results. On 9 Aug 2000, an ambush operation	•
	was reportedly launched against a convoy in which UBL was a passenger; it	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
	was unsuccessful. We have been unable to confirm that this operation actually	
· [	took place.	<b>⊣</b> · .
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٠. لــ	In addition to the unilateral efforts then underway also enlisted for capture and rendition operations against UBL. While	
	more common for expense and religition operations against CDD. With	
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	an exchan	ge to develop a plan t	or the capture and re	ndition of Usan	na Bin Ladın.	The	' . <b>]</b>
. [	main resou	urce to be used in this	plan was a group of	Afghan tribal a	ssets		
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	ontions to	capture and render U	RI including the am	hugh of a conve	provided s	ieveral Ri was	
	a passenge	er or an assault on the	compound being use	ed by UBL near	Kandahar. A	MON	_
	authorizin	g action to capture an	d render UBL was si	ened on Augus	1998.		1 .
1.15 <b>2</b> % hande		Fins	al details for the effo	rt.were complet	ed by Septem	ber	
_	1998.						
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				nued to monitor			<del>-</del>
	effort to la results.	unch a capture operat	ion. This activity co	ntinued for seve	ral months wi	th no	
• •	100000	·	•	:	•		•
		On 1	December 24, 1998,	the Afghan gro	up was told th	at,	
•	under new	guidelines just receiv a capture operation, i	red, they were only a	uthorized to us	e lethal force i	n the	
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1	that a successful operat	ion to capture was not fe	essible. Following rece	int of this new	
	directive, the group der	veloned new plans		Apt of and now	]
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Į l	of vehicles in which III	BL was believed to be a	had launched an ambus	sn against a convoy	
	when the attackers hear	rd the voices of women a	ind children	i was terrimated	7
[		We have been una	ble to confirm that this		
:	took place. Although the	ne group continued moni	toring the activities of	UBL until the	
i .	September 11, 2001 We successful operation to	orld Trade Center attack	s, they were unable to	execute a	
	successful operation to	capture OBL.			
	·	The principal reason	n for the inability to ex	ecute the capture	
		as the absence of timely	and accurate intelligen		
*	intentions, and travel of			throughout	•
	me operational period.	UBL was absent, for ext		arom the area in eavy security for	,
l	UBL also had an adven	se impact on efforts by the			
	operation throughout th	e operational period. Va	rious questions on the	reporting accuracy	
		also surfaced during the			
		nswered satisfactorily. To posed operations based:			
	decisions regarding pro	posed operations based :	solery ou reporting nor	n ans group.	
	Executing The Plan		•	•.	
<u>.</u>		In the enring of 199	9 CIA began to put in p	nlace the elements	
	of its operational strate	gy, "The Plan." At the time			
		impact on the al Qa'ida			
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and the control of the AMES STATES of the	By the sprin	g of 1999. CIA		had	FRANCE AND COMMON COMPRISACIONA COMPRISACION
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	terrorist cen	s in Aidania, Azerbaijan	and		
•	stopped at le	east two probable attacks	against US interests in		
		Gulf region. In addition,			
		l international terrorist in se countries and the region			
		ceptions about its ability			
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		was in addition to effor			
•		ssy bombings to justice.			•
		es was not only going aft out also seeking out, bree			•
		olanning future attacks w			
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	Our revamped approach began to pay big divide end of 1999 and continuing on in 2000.	idends towards	
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 al-Qa'ida. We cooperated with foreign number of specific terrorist plots.	liaison services throughout the w	orld to break up a
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The Kuala Lumpur Meeting		
It was during the Decen period that two of the September 11 hij Hazmi—came across our screen, which identify them but not uncover the plot to	h has raised the question of how w	Nawaf al- ve were able to
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	this case superbly while others revealed flaws in our approach that we subsequently addressed.		
	Turning first to how we were able to identify al-Mindhar and al-Hazr	mi.	
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لم	SIGINT fi about the travel of possible Bin Ladin operatives to	rom	
· · . L	Malaysia. As a consequence surveillance		
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	concerned that the suspects were traveling to Malaysia to support regional terrorist pl	ans	
	or operations.		
	The results of these efforts meant that we knew Khalid al-Mihdhar's	frue	
	name by early January 2000 and Nawaf al-Hazmi's by early March 2000. These two		
	dates, respectively, were our first opportunities to watch list them. We had another		
•	opportunity to do so in December 2000, when we were able to link one of the Cole		•
	bombing suspects as a participant in the Kuala Lumpur meeting. In August 2001, as a	<b>a</b>	
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	result of increasing concern about an al Qa'ida attack in the US, we reviewed our		
	holdings and on August 23, 2001, sent to the Department of State, FBI, INS, as	nd	<i>:</i>
	holdings and on August 23, 2001, sent to the Department of State, FBI, INS, at other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered in	nd	. ·
	holdings and on August 23, 2001, sent to the Department of State, FBI, INS, as other US Government agencies requesting that al-Hazmi and al-Mihdhar be entered in TIPOFF	nd	
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	Attempting to Capture Bin Ladin	<b>-</b>
	Let us now turn to our specific activities in the Afghanistan	
S	anctuary to capture and render Bin Ladin.	]
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	None of the available potential capture units were judged to	
T	ave more than a ten percent chance of capturing Bin Ladin.	
. <b>"</b>	• fehan tribal group	
	was judged to be unlikely to successfully	ı
	attack a heavily guarded Bin Ladin.	
· ·		
	Masood had to be engaged to help in the attempt to capture Bin Ladin, but	
, ,	with the understanding that he would be his own man, never an agent or	
	surrogate of the US Government, and would help if his interests intersected	
	with those of the United States. Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of	
	surrogate of the US Government, and would help if his interests intersected with those of the United States. Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of success against the Taliban were judged to be less than five percent.	7
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	with those of the United States. Even if he agreed to do so, his chances of	

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 In response, the Assistant DCI for Collection, the Assistant DCI for Military Support, and the Director of Military Operations (J-3) at the Pentagon agreed that Predator UAV recommaissance flights could be a useful source of actionable intelligence of on-the-ground terrorist activity in Afghanistan.

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C05374781 The decision to recommend to the NSC that CIA and the other agencies supporting the program be allowed to proceed with Predator testing and operations was made in late May 2000. The decision came only after considerable deliberations and debate at CIA about the Predator's utility as a collection platform, the manner in which the aircraft should be used, and the risks involved. mid-August 2000, the program was well on track and progressing rapidly. Testing began able to conduct the first Predator mission over September 7, 2000. Afghanistan The Taliban unsuccessfully scrambled a Mig-21 during and some in CIA expressed concern that the aircraft was vulnerable to detection Such concern intensified after the US Air Force notified CIA that it would have to pay for lost aircraft. the UAV had completed 10 missions with varying degrees of success. 61 TOP SECRET

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	It is important to note that at this time CIA and the policy	
$(\varphi^{(k)})^{(k)} = (\kappa_k \varphi_k)^{-1}$	community saw the objectives of the Predator program as two-fold; giving the United	
	States "eyes on the target" capability and collecting intelligence	
	<ul> <li>Twice in the fall of 2000, the Predator observed an individual most likely to be Bin Ladin; however, we had no way at the time to react to this information.</li> </ul>	
	Planning began for a 2001	_
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	deployment, and counterterrorism officials discussed the possibility of capitalizing on an Air Force program to weaponize the Predator by adapting it to carry and fire Hellfire missiles.	
•	CIA recognized that significant issues would need to be resolved to	
	implement the program.	] .
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	<ul> <li>CIA leadership from the beginning felt it important that there was a full understanding by the President and the National Security Council of the capabilities of the armed Predator and the implications of its use.</li> </ul>	
ii.	The decision to advocate arming the Predator followed	**
	considerable devate within the Agency.	
	<ul> <li>Some contended that the potential risks involved in deploying an armed aircraft exceeded the potential intelligence return or operational advantages,</li> </ul>	o escensos III (film uses se
William IN- MYSS.	while others argued that the opportunity to strike at Bin Ladin, it he could be located, would outweigh the risks involved in an aircraft being shot down over	
	Afghanistan.	
	Another debate centered on whether reconnaissance only	
<del>.</del>	flights should be conducted while the weaponized capability was being engineered and policy and legal questions were being resolved.	
	Some maintained that flying the Predator for reconnaissance purposes	
	produced high-quality imagery intelligence and insights	
	that could not be obtained otherwise.	
	<ul> <li>Others posed what eventually became the Agency's position: that continued use of the UAV for reconnaissance only could reveal to al-Qa'ida and the Taliban the areas in Afghanistan in which the United States was particularly</li> </ul>	
	interested and possibly result in shooting one down. Either premature	
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discovery or loss would reduce the chances of success if policymakers later decided to use the weaponized aircraft.

Liability for lost Predators and developing a command and control arrangement also emerged as important issues.

Neither DoD nor CIA wanted to assume the cost of lost UAVs. While we finally agreed to split the cost evenly, the question was still in negotiation

It is important to emphasize, however, that this issue, while contentious, did not slow down the program. We continued to work all the preparations for deployment, including resolving several technical problems with the missile, with the full expectation that the funding question would eventually be resolved.

September 4. As a result, CIA was authorized


reconnaissance purposes only.

## Continued Warning

The leadership of the Agency repeatedly warned the policy community in the Executive Branch and the Congress of the seriousness of the threat.

- During the Millennium threat in late 1999, we told the President to expect between 5 to 15 terrorist attacks against American interests both here and overseas.
- In spring and summer of 2001, we sought every opportunity to vehemently
  express our concern about the high level of threat, and we launched the
  massive program of disruption described above.
- We placed the Bin Ladin threat prominently in every single annual testimony
  to the appropriate Congressional Committees on the Worldwide Threat since
  1998. In the 1999 testimony, for example, the DCI stated that, "There is not
  the slightest doubt that Bin Ladin is planning attacks against us. He will strike

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	YYY 1 to the desired and a second and the collection and entered			
	High priority issues had resource consequences for collection, operations, and analysis. And some of these issues required increased tasking of collection assets that			
1 1	were in direct competition with our efforts on terrorism.			
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<u> </u>	CONTACT OF THE PROPERTY OF THE			
	Summary of CIA's Collection Posture Against UBL's Sanctuary			
	By September 2001 our intelligence collection posture in			
	Afghanistan covered a wide array of capabilities that could help bring about CIA's			. •
	strategy against Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida.			
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•	Following UBL's departure from Sudan in the spring of 1996, we had	1		- }
	intelligence operations targeting his Afghanistan presence			
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	By spring 1998 we had opened contact with the Northern Alliance's Commander Masood and the UISFA			1
	Commander Masood and the Olska			1
·	The period following the DCI's December 4, 1998 declaration of war	ר		
	memo saw a continued buildup			1
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	<u>:</u>
Our efforts against al-Qa'ida over nearly a decade, and particularly our	J .
actions to penetrate the Taliban sanctuary, laid the groundwork for our rapid response to the September 11 attacks. This, in conjunction with our close coordination with the	
the September 11 attacks. This, in conjunction with our close coordination with the	
Department of Defense, was a major factor in the US Government's ability to defeat the Taliban and drive out al-Qa'ida from its Afghan redoubts with minimal casualties.	
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	During the IC's nearly decade-long war with Bin Ladin and al-Qa'ida prior to September 11 we learned enormously about the threat—their intentions, their methods, their tactics, their determination, their strengths, and their vulnerabilities.
	<ul> <li>We used this knowledge to improve our operations, to exploit every opportunity to collect information on the threat, and to gauge the risks and costs of what it would take to defeat the enemy.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>We also used it to provide strategic warning that al-Qa'ida was the number one threat to the security of Americans and that a major attack against US interests, possibly including even the US homeland, was coming. We succeeded in giving the policymaker a good appreciation of the increasing danger the US faced from the terrorists.</li> </ul>
	Al-Qa'ida's extreme security measures, compartmentation, and sophisticated tradecraft, as well as their sanctuary in Afghanistan, prevented us from obtaining the detailed information required to provide tactical warning of the major attacks against our embassies in East Africa, of the bombing of the USS Cole, and of the tragedies of September 11.
	• In each of these cases, we saw the smoke but could not see the flames directly.  When we talk about results, it is natural to focus on those instances when terrorist operations succeed by making horrific headlines. Seldom do we discuss the headlines that might have been were it not for disruptions by the heroic efforts of our intelligence and law enforcement officers.
	Examples of those headlines would include: "Hundreds killed during     Millennium terror attacks
medicaso, or a minorates	to name a few where we know plots were successfully disrupted.
	The IC's war with al-Qa'ida taught us a few ingredients that boost the prospects for success:
	The various INTs working together produce better results.
	Close cooperation with friendly liaison services is essential.
	Aggressively tracking down all leads increases the chances for disruption.
	• Finally, good luck helps.
	Our success in thwarting the plot US Embassy in Tirana is an excellent example
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	Our ating their state Williams and an analysis to	to di muo lannocho di
	Our actions during the Millennium, when, as already relat a massive worldwide effort that led to the arrest of many terrorists and the cells overseas, showed the importance of close cooperation with foreign I	ed, we launched breakup of
	cells overseas, showed the importance of close cooperation with foreign l	iaison friends.
	There were no attacks, and we probably saved thousands of livery the saved the sa	7es.
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	To Delas .				•
	With the in	crease <u>in Ramadan-rela</u>	ated threat renorting i	n November-	
	December 2000, CIA worke	d with	to det	ect and preempt	
	attacks.				<del></del>
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		In the spring and sur	nmer 2001, we launc	hed another	<del></del>
•	massive disruption effort in indicators of imminent attack	response to the increase ks. Our actions stopped	e in terrorist operation   several attacks and t	nai activity and probably caused	
	terrorists to postpone others.	For example			
					٠.
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<del></del>	The IC	also was at war with o	ther terrorist groups,	not just al-	
	Qa'ida. And we scored succe	esses on those fronts to	<b>o.</b>		
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
Impact of September 11  The tragedies of September 11 did what the Intelligence Community's loud and incessant warnings could not do. They galvanized the attention and ended the inhibitions of the US Government; they galvanized and entraged the American people into action; and they galvanized foreign governments to take strong measures against terrorism.  • We, together with our allies, used our military power to clean out the terrorist den that Afghanistan had become.  • We are spending billions of dollars in addressing lax security measures around our nation's transportation infrastructure, particularly airports.  • We are implementing vastly increased security measures around our energy and industrial infrastructure.  • We are revamping the process surrounding the administration of foreign student visas and developing the kinds of information flows to keep track of foreign visitors.  We have significantly expanded the authorities and resources of the Intelligence and Law Enforcement Communities to target the terrorist threat.  • The USA Patriot Act of 2001, among other things, removed legal impediments to the ability of law enforcement agencies to share with CIA  • Because of the strong support we have received from these Committees and the Congress, we have significantly increased the funding and security, logistics, technology, and communications support to our counterterrorism objectives.  • These new resources have buttressed our pre-September 11 initiatives to  None of these authorities, resources, and measures would have been likely without the traumatic impact of September 11. There is now a whole new approach to the issue of homeland security.		TOP SECRET
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# DCI TASK FORCE REPORT: IMPROVING INTELLIGENCE WARNING

INTRODUCTION

#### Purpose of the Task Force

The Task Force on Intelligence Warning was formed in response to a request by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). His concern, as he explained it to the Task Force at our first meeting, was: "Does the intelligence warning structure that the Community now has in place make sense, and is it adequate in light of the changes taking place in the world." The DCI further explained that he felt fundamental changes were probably called for since the traditional, first priority "Warsaw Pact threat" warning problem, "big W," was transitioning to threats stemming from world-wide instabilities, "little w," and to warning needs deriving from new dimensions to the national security interests of the United States. All members of the Task Force agree that the DCI's concerns are timely and that intelligence warning is of such national importance that a thorough review of the Community's posture is necessary. Further, in view of planned US military force draw downs and the adoption of a new National Military Strategy--which emphasizes short-notice responses to regional crises and reconstitution of forces in response to the emergence of major threats--the intelligence warning mission remains a critical one. We believe we have completed our assignment, as reflected by this report's "ground truth" judgements and assessments. Further, we are confident that our recommendations are appropriate and responsive to the DCI's need for support in his capacity as the nation's principal intelligence warning officer.

### Definition of Intelligence Warning

The Director of Central Intelligence Directive (DCID) 6/1 on National Intelligence Warning defines the mission of intelligence warning as "...to avoid surprise, to the President, the National Security Council and to the Armed Forces of the United States by foreign events of major importance to the security of the U.S." The Task Force believes this definition remains essentially valid, <u>provided</u> the intelligence programs implemented to fulfill the warning mission take cognizance of the new realities and intelligence demands of the 1990s. The kinds of foreign events, and the individual foreign nations, that are of major importance to the security and the interests of the U.S. have changed in recent years, and will continue to change. The result is a broader set of national consumers than the ones now identified in the DCID will need national intelligence warning support--for issues going well beyond foreign military attacks and government instabilities. -

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#### Fundamental Observations

Drawing on the assistance and the reflective remarks of forty-seven expert witnesses who collectively have been engaged in the production or the application of warning intelligence for over four decades, the Task Force developed four fundamental observations that heavily influenced our approach to evaluating the Community's intelligence warning activities, and the formulation of our recommendations. These observations are:

- o Providing policymakers with persuasive intelligence warning—in time for them to act in ways that influence a potential foreign development likely to be adverse to the interest of the United States—is the most important intelligence service the Community can perform for the security of the U.S.
- o Sustained, effective intelligence warning has been an elusive goal of the Intelligence Community for the entire duration of the modern Community's existence; all bureaucratic solutions previously attempted have not worked for the long haul.
- o Many credible senior intelligence managers believe, as does the Task Force, that all major intelligence warning failures of the past five decades have been the result of the Community's inability to consolidate and analyze diffuse raw intelligence successfully, and to extract a meaningful warning judgement; no such failure has been rooted in a simple dearth of information.
- o Except for the priority requirement of warning of a military attack on the U.S. or its allies by the former Soviet Union, the National Intelligence Community has never seriously attempted to establish dedicated analytical programs for intelligence warning on a global scale.

## Scope of the Intelligence Warning Issue

The above set of observations were a sobering and challenging point of departure for the Task Force. The storyline of these observations is very stark. First, intelligence warning should be the first priority of the Intelligence Community because of its high payoff value, but it isn't. Second, although the magnitude and scope of US intelligence activities provide ample data to make effective intelligence warning possible, the "warning problem" has yet to be solved. Third, except for the Warsaw Pact "big W" threat, a major effort to provide intelligence warning on the full range of US national security interests has never been attempted.

The Task Force realized that these issues constitute the fundamental challenge to be solved by our effort, while the detailed structure of the National Warning System is of secondary importance. This scope change, in part, was the result of the insightful testimonies of several experienced intelligence officers, whose remarks vividly pointed out that there are many dimensions to the causes of the historical poor-to-marginal performance of the National Intelligence Community for

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intelligence warning. In view of this historical perspective, the Task Force realizes that the recommendations proposed here are likely to fall short of constituting any total solution to the problem of providing effective intelligence warning; we believe, however, that they point in the right direction.

### DIMENSIONS OF THE CHALLENGE

#### Odds Favor the Adversary

The Task Force believes that the objective of effective intelligence warning has remained an elusive goal for the Community, not because of any lack of serious efforts to work the problem in the past on the part of many highly qualified and motivated people, but because the mission itself—even assuming the acceptance of warning on the part of consumers, which is often not the case—is extremely difficult for at least four sets of reasons.

First, intelligence warning is difficult because it often hinges on assessments of intentions, on the specific moves contemplated by a foreign principal during complex situations. Often the foreign principal's intentions are not fixed during the formulative stages of a crisis situation. Hence intelligence cannot easily anticipate decisions that the subject actors themselves have not yet made. Also, technical means and security procedures are becoming increasingly available that help these foreign subjects conceal their intentions, plus their directives for implementation actions, and are extremely challenging to US intelligence capabilities. Intelligence warning has been, is, and will likely remain so analytically challenging that a high rate of success cannot be guaranteed. Not trying, however, will result in unacceptable risks to the nation.

## Stacked-Deck Against the Analyst

A second dimension of the challenge of providing effective intelligence warning was brought to the attention of the Task Force by numerous witnesses. It was explained repeatedly that practically all the environmental factors that analysts in the major intelligence organizations are subject to make it difficult for them to produce break-through warning assessments. difficulties begin with inherited and developed cultural views that often skew analysts' interpretations of data on non-western culture nations. Though it is almost a cliche, post-mortems on intelligence warning failures continue to note that such failures are often due to a lack of understanding of the radically different values and motives of a foreign adversary relative to the social-economic-cultural yardsticks that most US intelligence analysts make judgments by. Furthermore, many bureaucratic and professional "environmental" factors within the intelligence community put a premium on consensus and inhibit general consideration of the "unthinkable" interpretation of ambiguous intelligence.

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#### Structural Deficiencies

A third dimension of the intelligence warning challenge has to do with the Community's posture and practices established specifically for intelligence warning, i.e., the National Warning Intelligence System. Though the Task Force recognizes that organizational structure changes by themselves can make only marginal improvements in the performance of the warning mission, we nevertheless believe that there are serious deficiencies in the current National Intelligence Warning System structure.

if the National Intelligence Warning System is meant to be an integrated inter-agency process with procedures for compiling and prioritizing requirements, with standards for assessing warning conditions on a global basis, and with systematic reporting and dissemination procedures, then no such "system" currently exists and the National Warning System is more of an illusion than a reality. The Defense Intelligence Warning component of the National System does have considerable structure and standards, but the scope of this operation does not make it a substitute for a national system.

# New Intelligence Warning Challenges

The fourth dimension of the "warning problem" lies in the fact that the current structure and in-place programs and systems for intelligence warning were largely designed for the traditional "big W" problem. The Task Force believes that the scope of US intelligence warning activities needs to be expanded, if not now then eventually, to encompass the full range of US national security concerns, such as economic competitiveness, global energy management and global environment management. The identity of new consumers, the dynamic state of policy development, and even the role of national intelligence itself are all issues that are in a state of flux regarding these and other new national security concerns. Structuring a relevant intelligence warning analytical program for these new dimensions to foreign affairs will remain a formidable challenge.

#### CURRENT STATE-OF-AFFAIRS

#### DCID 6/1 Players

The Task Force reviewed DCID 6/1 for two purposes: (1) To determine if the guidance provided in this directive still makes sense in the context of an era where "little w" is becoming the priority need of the nation, not "big w"; and (2) To use the principal provisions in the directive as a reference for understanding the current community structure and its assignment of responsibilities for national intelligence warning. On the whole, the intent and directions provided in DCID 6/1 remain pertinent today. It is clear that the Directive was meant to be the basis for an aggressive, coordinated Community effort on warning intelligence, collectively referred to as the National Intelligence Warning System.

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National Intelligence Officer for Warning (NIO/W), who is to be the focal point for Community-wide warning matters; the Community components with a responsibility for warning intelligence, for
A major weakness with the DCID is that below the DCI,
responsibilities are distributed and, therefore, overall accountability is open-ended.
We are to really required to the
No one is really responsible for the viäbility of the whole System however; the Task Force believes that this flaw in the DCID is a major reason why the full intent of the DCID has never been realized, as explained below.
Community Posture
The Task Force found that the overall level of analytical effort explicitly devoted to warning throughout the Community is
sparse and unfocused.
expressed the current state-of-affairs, "the business of warning, while important, is essentially underdeveloped, underfunded, unprofessionalized and surprisingly under-defined,
especially analysis." The findings of the Task Force do not
dispute this statement. It needs to be highlighted, however, that this state-of-affairs is not a recent condition. The

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# National Intelligence Officer for Warning

The Task Force recognizes that the establishment of the NIO/W position has proved to be a very meaningful step for fostering intelligence warning. But in a sense it has been a token approach toward National Intelligence Warning. A full commitment to give the NIO/W definitive operational responsibilities, to provide sufficient infrastructure support, to institutionalize his or her responsibilities with the NFIB, and with the mission of each of the NFIC Program Managers, has never been made.

As a result, however, the NIO/W and his or her immediate staff have become a substitute for, not the linchpin of, a substantial Community-wide intelligence warning program.

intelligence warning is treated as a by-product. This indirect approach for identifying warning intelligence is inadequate.

## NFIP Program Managers

While the GDIP Program Manager has a very extensive intelligence warning system in place, the other Program Managers do not-beyond the mission of flagging an impending strategic attack against the United States. All Program Managers sponsor watch center operations, which contribute to the warning mission to a considerable degree. On a day-to-day basis, however, these centers emphasize current intelligence reporting, which more often than not addresses intelligence warning implicitly rather than explicitly. Their topical coverage is also open-ended rather than focused on specific consumer warning needs. The DCI centers play important intelligence warning roles when a foreign development becomes a crisis management situation. Overall, however, there is little organized production in any of the Programs devoted to long-term strategic warning issues.

# National Warning Staff

The National Warning Staff is not now staffed or positioned to act as a major national player in the Community for intelligence warning. Its role needs clarification, and its relationship within the Community needs to be strengthened through better personal communications and mutual coordination of efforts.

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## Summary Assessment

This is not to say that there is no organized and effective national intelligence warning work underway in the Community. The efforts and products of the NIO/W, including his immediate staff and the NWS, were repeatedly praised by consumers on the NSC Staff, in Defense, and by the Congressional Intelligence Oversight Committee staffs as often being very insightful and generally out in front of emerging threats. The regional NIOs and all Agencies make important contributions to the steady flow of intelligence to consumers which results in a continuing awareness of foreign developments, the most basic form of intelligence warning. The NID and PDB are clear standouts on this score. The Defense Intelligence Warning System provides an active warning network with a global mission to support the CINCs as well as the National System. And under crisis management conditions, the Community invariably rallies and focuses on warning assessments that support departmental needs as well as the collective national security process. Nevertheless, these activities are not sufficiently coherent and do not have enough consistent integrity to be regarded as a National Intelligence Warning System. This weakness is very apparent to the consumers, who both exploit and disdain what they generally perceive to be, with respect to warning issues, a fractionated and indecisive Intelligence Community.

#### ANALYTICAL ISSUES

## Relevant On-going Analytical Improvements

The Task Force does not have a simple solution to the formidable challenge of changing the analytical environment in large intelligence agencies to foster more insightful intelligence warning on a routine basis. We note that the steps directed by the DCI to improve National Estimates are very complementary to this end. We particularly endorse the new emphasis on including more alternative views and on encouraging more adversarial explorations of available data in the analytical processes supporting National Intelligence Estimates. The guidance to include a worst case scenario in draft estimates should directly result in improved intelligence warning assessments of possible emerging threats. While moving in the right direction, however, the Task Force does not believe that these efforts, by themselves, will sufficiently improve intelligence warning.

### Differing Analytical Techniques

A question the Task Force explored in some depth is the issue of whether the analytical process for deriving intelligence warning is different from routine, all-source finished intelligence production. This question is important because if there are fundamental differences in analytical approaches, then the structural solutions for intelligence warning should cater to the unique approaches of intelligence warning that seem to workin order to optimize the process. On the surface, it appears that both types of analysts follow the same fundamental

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analytical processes, i.e. they both commonly apply the principles of deductive and inferential logic, they build evidential cases based upon the same type of data sources, and they rely on experience-derived expertise for developing conclusions based on proven precedents. The explanation of why warning analysts are more likely to identify threatening developments lies in the fact that they approach a problem with the objective intent of doing so, and other analysts most often do not.

# Leveraging Targeted Collection

The Task Force found that all elements in the Community who are concerned with intelligence warning need to pay more attention to collection requirements management. Beside the personal efforts of the NIO/W--and for traditional threats, e.g., North Korea--there appears to be little current interagency coordination, or any central approach for developing a comprehensive collection strategy on warning concerns before they become crisis management problems. On-going Community restructuring plans, which include several changes for more effective collection management, and the naming of a VC/NIC with collection responsibilities, make it an opportune time to develop imaginative collection programs in support of intelligence warning. Along with existing collection systems, the planned expansion in HUMINT potentials for acquiring raw intelligence that has high value for intelligence warning. Better leveraging the full complement of US intelligence collection capabilities for global intelligence warning could be an important step toward enhancing the Community's performance in this important sphere.

# RECOMMENDATIONS

# Proposed Strategy

In view of the high priority senior consumers accord to intelligence warning, and the challenge of the task, the Task Force believes a comprehensive strategy is necessary in order to achieve fundamental improvements in the Community's performance on intelligence warning. The recommendations that follow are a complementary set, designed as the base set of actions needed to launch the strategy. The merit of each recommendation should be judged in this total context.

The Task Force's proposed strategy for improved intelligence warning is keyed to five strategic objectives:

- o Improve the Community-wide support to the DCI, in his role as the nation's principal intelligence warning officer, by establishing a process for developing explicitly articulated warning assessments that are both timely and relevant to the interests, concerns and priorities of senior consumers.
- o Establish accountability for warning intelligence efforts by clearly assigning responsibilities and by conducting periodic performance evaluations.

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- o Establish a base analytical program for warning intelligence production, structured on the premise that warning intelligence is more comprehensive if provided both by line units and by elements dedicated to warning assessments.
- o Facilitate Community-wide sharing of alternative warning assessments, and of related time sensitive intelligence pertinent to national intelligence warning assessments.
- o Improve the quality of intelligence warning analysis throughout the Community through the sustained training of analysts, augmented by methodology research--plus focused management attention to warning intelligence issues.

The Task Force holds that a more institutionalized intelligence warning system than now exists will result from the pursuit of these strategic objectives. That is, substantial analytical programs, routine collection initiatives, and increased inter-agency participation will result and, therefore, give more depth to the National Intelligence Warning System.

### Recommendation One: DCI Endorsement

The Task Force recommends that the DCI explicitly endorse the above strategy for improved intelligence warning and ask for the complete cooperation of all NFIC principals in its implementation.

## Recommendation Two: Single Individual Accountable

The Task Force recommends that the NIO/W be named Vice Chairman of the NIC for Warning (VC/NIC/W), to serve as the DCI's principal advisor on warning. Though the aversion to proliferating NIC Vice Chairmen is shared by the Task Force, this status matches and truly reflects the enhanced responsibilities of the NIO/W that we recommend. The VC/NIC/W would not be just a focal point for warning but would be the principal advisor to the DCI on all matters pertaining to warning. We see the VC/NIC/W discharging this responsibility in two ways: (1) The individual in question will be the principal substantive advisor on warning issues to the DCI and to the NFIB; and (2) The individual will provide advice to each of the NFIP components on their respective roles and postures for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. As the DCI's principal advisor on warning matters, the VC/NIC/W will:

o Assure that the DCI is provided intelligence warning, in a timely manner, that is relevant to senior policymakers interests and to national level policy issues. The VC/NIC/W's primary responsibility in this sphere is to ensure that a process is in place that supports the DCI with warning assessments on a Community-wide basis--a process that results in: Assessments that are full-ranged regarding all reasonably possible scenarios; assessments that are either prepared by or under the NIOs' direction, or that include their views; and that allow the

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VC/NIC/W to add his or her personal assessment when the VC/NIC/W judges the community product to be incomplete or even misleading.

- o Assure that timely intelligence warnings are disseminated to consumers in a progressive fashion, keyed to the pace of a developing situation.
- o Provide quidance to warning elements of Community components to ensure that all their efforts are mutually complementary, inclusive of the needs of all priority consumers, and responsive to the strategic objectives cited above.
- o Monitor the operations of these Community component warning elements within the context of their participation in the national intelligence warning system, particularly with respect to sharing new and alternative warning assessments and supporting the preparation of national warning products.
- o Advise the NFIP principals and the directors of their components on their operational roles, training programs and overall posture for supporting the National Warning System.
- o Report periodically to the DCI, the NFIC and other concerned Departments on the Community's performance with respect to intelligence warning as well as on future warning intelligence requirements.

## Recommendation Three: Dedicated Warning Elements

The Task Force recommends that each major NFIP component establish or designate, as appropriate, an element whose mission is to act as the focal point for warning within that organization and to network with its counterparts in the other organizations that collectively constitute the National Intelligence Warning System. Though these elements are under the operational management of their parent organizations, they should be responsive to general guidance provided by the VC/NIC/W. These elements need not be large, but the analysts in them should be experienced individuals with demonstrated skills. The elements do need to be positioned within their parent organization in ways that give them direct access to senior levels of management. With respect to function, these elements should:

- o Perform and monitor investigative intelligence analyses directed at identifying and/or tracking potential warning concerns, in response to guidance provided by, among others, the VC/NIC/W.
- o Make internal line units aware of the dynamic warning interests of consumers in order to better posture these units for initiating warning assessments that are timely and relevant to consumer interests.
- Act as the organization in question's agent for sharing new and alternative warning assessments, and related time sensitive

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intelligence, with all counterparts in the interagency warning intelligence network and with the VC/NTC/W.

- o Ensure that tailored collection requirements are initiated, and encompass all reasonably possible scenarios that could generate high threat warnings.
- o Support the preparation of national warning products by directly participating in their production or by supporting other elements within their organization in their preparation of such products.
- o Facilitate the establishment of warning intelligence training programs and the development and appropriate use of warning intelligence methodologies within their organization.

#### Recommendation Four: Streamline The Structure

The Task Force recommends the following additional structural changes to the current operation of the National Intelligence Warning System in order to improve the effectiveness of these operations and to provide adequate support to the VC/NIC/W:

o All major Community components should adopt or reinstitute the practice of designating an officer--presumably the Director of its warning element--with specific responsibilities for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. Other Executive Branch components and departments should be encouraged to, at least, designate a liaison officer as a point-of-contact to the VC/NIC/W staff.

institute regular--at least monthly--meetings that draw together relevant regional NIOs, plus senior representatives and substantive experts from the Community's warning components. A specific warning document should be issued after each such meeting.

o The National Warning Staff should be converted into an enhanced support staff to the VC/NIC/W. The duties of the individual members of this new staff should be defined in a complementary fashion so that the VC/NIC/W is assisted by functional experts in all of his or her many responsibilities. It is imperative that the staff be collocated with the VC/NIC/W.

## Recommendation Five: Broaden The Scope

The Task Force recommends that the concept of national intelligence warning no longer be limited to military attacks and the instabilities of foreign national governments. Instead, this concept should be a variable encompassing the full range of current U.S. national interest and security concerns.

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Recommendation Six: Revise The DCID

The Task Force recommends that DCID 6/1 be revised to reflect any and all changes stemming from the above recommendations that the DCI endorses.

#### A TASK FORCE CONCERN

#### The Resource Issue

The Task Force recognizes that the recommendations offered are challenging and will encompass legitimate management concerns. Nevertheless, we believe extraordinary efforts are required when attempting to make cultural changes, which is the implicit objective of our proposed strategy for improving intelligence warning. We would not have recommended such extraordinary efforts if the priority of the problem did not warrant them and if we did not have confidence in the leadership of the Community to accomplish the tasks called for. Our only major concern is the future resource posture of the Community and its capability to support an enhanced National Intelligence Warning System as envisioned by the proposed strategy. In view of the centinuing importance of intelligence warning, plus the increasing complexity of what warning needs to encompass, it would be a national mistake if adequate resources to support the warning mission of the 1990s should not be available.

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**MUST CREDIT INTELWIRE.com** ww.intelwire.com C05464170 (b)(1)SECRET (b)(3)EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs EO 12958 3.5(c) TO: FROM: OFFICE: DATE: 05/15/2001 12:33:43 PM SUBJECT: query Yeah. Everything you write is consistent with my understanding of that suspicious travel in January 2000. Also, here are my "timeline" entries the early-mid January 2000 events, which includes travel to Malaysia by "Khaled" My guess always was that Khaled was in fact Quso and Nawaf might have been Khallad. could have been Salim, but who knows. operatives in Yemen is called "al-Nibras."

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**MUST CREDIT INTELWIRE.com** C05464172 FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 August 2002 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: OFFICE: Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar SUBJECT: REFERENCE: Original Text of Original Text of TO: FROM: OFFICE: DATE: 08/21/2001 04:05:02 PM SUBJECT: 国Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar WHAT?:?? Same passport number? How interesting. I know his fellow travelers made one or two trips to the US in the same January time frame, yes? Probably would be useufl to memorialize the US visits of the party in a cable..... as I was reviewing all the cables on Khalid Al-Mihdhdar, I noticed he had a U.S. Visa in his passport. I asked INS to check and they just came back and said he entered the U.S. on 15 January 2000 and listed the Los Angeles as his destination. He departed the U.S. on 10 June 2000. I looked through traffic and could not find anything else. to FBI to pass what we know of Khalid Al-Mihdhar and that he entered the U.S. on 15 January. Maybe there is something they can do -- perhaps run his name by Ressam? I will be here in the morning, and will then be meeting with \_\_\_\_\_\_in the early afternoon to talk about the U.S.S. Cole and will give her a head's up. Let me know if you need me to do anything.

> APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE: 25-April-2012

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EO 12958 3.5(c)

**MUST CREDIT INTELWIRE.com** FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 6 August 2002 MEMORANDUM FOR: FROM: OFFICE: Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar SUBJECT: REFERENCE: Original Text of Original Text of TO: FROM: OFFICE: DATE: 08/21/2001 04:05:02 PM SUBJECT: 国Re: Khalid Al-Mihdhar WHAT?:?? Same passport number? How interesting. I know his fellow travelers made one or two trips to the US in the same January time frame, yes? Probably would be useufl to memorialize the US visits of the party in a cable..... as I was reviewing all the cables on Khalid Al-Mihdhdar, I noticed he had a U.S. Visa in his passport. I asked INS to check and they just came back and said he entered the U.S. on 15 January as his destination. He departed the U.S. on 10 June 2000. I 2000 and listed the Los Angeles looked through traffic and could not find anything else. I'll be sending to FBI to pass what we know of Khalid Al-Mihdhar and that he entered the U.S. on 15 January. Maybe there is something they can do - perhaps run his name by Ressam? I will be here in the morning, and will then be meeting with in the early afternoon to talk about the U.S.S. Cole and will give her a head's up. Let me know if you need me to do anything.

> APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE: 25-April-2012

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TO: FROM: OFFICE: DATE: SUBJECT:	Michael F. 05/05/98	Scheuer	=				· :	•	
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toma s carry				<u> </u>			f success	are	
anticipated	but not real	ly planne	this type - hu d for - and th n I anticipate	e thing coul	ariables w	hich can	<b>j</b> be		•. . •

APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE: 25-April-2012

CC: Sent on 5 May 1998

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		02 September 1998
The state of the s	SUBJECT: Talking Points Regarding U the DCI's 2 September 199	
	The Intellig	ence Community (IC)
** to . #-dis 2995-	knows more about Usama Bin Ladin that tier terrorist organization.	n about any other top
	covert action operations have been p	repared
 	indicted, and most of the information action was acquired by CIA.	Bin Ladin has been n pertinent to that
्ये	Render Bin Ladin to Justi rendition operation was designed, pra and ready to go in May 1998.	
74	b. Participation/Contribution of Components:	of other IC
	DoJ: high-level	
	NSA: moderateDoD: low-level	
**	FBI: low-level	
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· .	has allowed us to put a capture/rendition operation into	_
•	motion.	
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		·.
	Retaliation by Bin Ladin's organization and its terrorist allies is certain after a capture operation—whether or not it is successful. That said, terrorist attacks by those organizations on U.S. interests are certain, whether or not we run an operation.	
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
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Many of these options are not in and of themselves a clear best choice.	
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pursue, the greater the likelihood that one will succeed.	<b>-</b> .
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R	OUTIN	G AND	RECO	RD SHEET
Talking Points:	Options	for Attac	cking the	Usema Bin Ladin Problem
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				24 November 1998
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	24 November 1998
	Options for Attacking the Usama Bin Ladin Problem
	Following are the range of options that are available for US policymakers to
• •	choose from to address the Usama Bin Ladin problem:
	CONTINUE CURRENT PLAN: We are keeping our tribal assets deployed
•	ambush and cantiles him as he moves around
	continue to try to bring Bin Ladin to justice.
	Upside: Little or no collateral damage to noncombatants
	Opside. Little of the conlateral dalitage to horizontalians
	<ul> <li>Downside: We are in a responding-to-events mode; we cannot take the initiative; limited likelihood of success.</li> </ul>
•	
	TRIBAL RAID ON ONE RESIDENCE:
	the tribals have completed plans for an armed, nighttime raid of one of the residences
•	
	Upside: Restores the initiative to us; plays to the paramilitary talents of the
	tribals; increases chances of success the tribals prefer this option to an ambush because they believe
	it is less dangerous to their forces both during the operation and after. The
	assets, for example, believe they can better control the operational setting when attacking a single house than when attacking a multi-vehicle convoy. They also
	believe that a raid has a better chance than an ambush of being executed
	quietly, thereby decreasing the chance that nearby Taliban security forces will be alerted.
	Douglaide: Increase side of addated douglast a name of a fact of a day
	Downside: Increases risk of collateral damage to noncombatants; increases the risk of casualties among our operatives; scenario lends itself to a quick response.
	by Taliban forces
	deal: if Bin Ladin is in the house he will either captured or killed—if the tribal
	assets achieve surprise capture is likely; if surprise is not achieved, Bin Ladin and his guards will resist and likely die in the engagement.
	and the grades will resist and tikely die tit the engagement.
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	A simultaneous cruise missile attack on each would increase the likelihood of catching Bin Ladin at one of them.  • Upside: Restores the initiative to us; no risk of US casualties; high chance of success if Bin Ladin is in one of the residences; little risk of casualties to our assets; clear signal of U.S. resolve.  • Downside: High risk to noncombatants; clear exposure of the US hand might miss some/all of the targets. Acute embarrassment if information inaccurate.	]
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		Masood is an outstanding	· .
	guerrilla commander	Masood is an outstanding whose northern Afghanistan-base has an agent network Masood agents/operatives might be able but would have a more difficult time capturing and then	,
	to kill Bin Ladin exfiltrating Bin Ladin	but would have a more difficult time capturing and then	
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- Upside: Gives us new Agency-run options; likely increase in FI on Bin Ladin; no risk to US lives.
- Downside: Low chance of success in capturing (as opposed to killing) UBL; reduced US ability to control asset actions; unlikely to produce results in near- or medium-term

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c05411978 we have been kept perpetually short-handed. and are still troubled or at least confounded, by the still unexplained decision to forego the capture op at tarnak last may, which in my estimate is still the best opportunity we have had. regret the length of this bleat, but having a chance to get ubi three times in 36 hours and foregoing the chance each time has made me a bit angry. I've driven officers relentlessly—at time ruthlessly and the administration has passed up a half-dozen good-to-excellent chances to complete the operation. my perception is that everytime a chance comes up the dci finds himself alone at the table, with the other principles basically saying "we'll go along with your decision mr. director," and implicitly saying that the agency will hang alone if the attack doesn't get bin ladin. it's a frustrating business, and indeed it's hard to understand their stark fear of attacking a terrorist bent on killing as many Americans as possible. still, you and we will continue to pursue the target with determination and professionalism, and hope best always. scheuer. CC: Sent on 17 May 1999

SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF (b)(1)  3 May 2001 (b)(3)  EO 12958 1.4(c)  EO 12958 3.5(c)  Terrorism: Bin Ladin Public Profile May Presage Attack  10-minute videotape of Bin Ladin the widest public airing  In a press conference in May 1998, just  months before the East Africa bombings, Bin Ladin used the media to predict news to gladden	58 3.5(c)
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the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and to reassert his importance as a backer of Islamic causes. Bin Ladin in January and February appeared in two videos about the wedding of his son; both featured rhetoric supporting the Al-Aqsa intifadah, and the second showed Bin Ladin reading a poem extolling the attack on the USS Cole	es. Bin h
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the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and to reassert his importance as a backer of Islamic causes. Bin Ladin in January and February appeared in two videos about the wedding of his son; both featured rhetoric supporting the Al-Aqsa intifadah, and the second showed Bin Ladin reading a poem extolling the attack on the USS Cole  APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE:	es. Bin h

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•	25.Jur	ne 2001 ·	EO 12958	
•	<u> </u>		•	
Terrorism: Bin L	adin and Associates Makin	g Near-Term Threats		
			xpect Usama )	Bin Ladin
to launch multiple	attacks over the coming day			
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	<del></del>			
	e consistent with what appea			
	news channel reported on Satu din last week and was told to			
interests during the		expect a severe blow a	iganiar oo ana	1010011
		•		
The station	did not show footage of the ir	nterview that would subst	antiate its clair	m, but the
correspond	ent's description of security r	nterview that would subst neasures imposed during	antiate its clain his meeting w	m, but the ith Bin
The station correspond  Ladin is co	ent's description of security r	nterview that would subst neasures imposed during	antiate its clair his meeting w	m, but the ith Bin
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			EO 12958 3.5(c)
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	SE	ENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 30 June 2001	
	Terrorism: Bin Ladin Planu	ning High-Profile Attacks	
	Operatives linked to Usama B planning to have dramatic concasualties	Bin Ladin's organization expect the near- nsequences, such as	term attacks they are major
	uproar in two weeks.		
	·		
	I		
		Arabian Peninsula as a likely ve	nue for an anti-US
[	attack.	Arabian Peninsula as a likely ve	
].		Yemen	nue for an anti-US  Kuwait and Bahrain.
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].		Yemen	
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·[		Yemen	
		Yemen	
.[	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jon	Yemen vidan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jon	Yemen vidan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vidan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vidan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vidan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
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	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vrdan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vrdan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vrdan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.
	Attacks on targets in Israel, Jor	Yemen vrdan, and Europe also could occur.	Kuwait and Bahrain.

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	SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIE	F
	International: Bin Ladin Attacks May Be Imminent	
	Multiple reports indicate that extremists  over the coming days, possibly against US or Israeli interests.	Ladin to launch attacks
	Bin Ladin₄ was in hi	iding.
	An Arabic news channel  Monday that Bin Ladin had gone into hiding in Afghanistan bairstrike.	reported on because he feared a US
	The time frame may be flexible. US facilities have been warned of the security, which could delay an attack because operatives would need	to revise their plans.
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•	TOP SECRET,	EO 12958 1.4(c)<2 EO 12958 3.5(c)
	SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF 30 June 2001	
Т	errorism: Bin Ladin Threats Are Real	
<b>7</b>	he US is not the target of a disinformation campaign by Usama Bin Lad warning of near-term attacks against US and Israeli interest public statements issued by his organization,	s is consistent with
· ·	otivations.	
	Bin Ladin's aides last week told a journalist to expect attacks against targets during the next two weeks, a bold move that risks Bin Ladin fails to follow through.	
	The Taliban had insisted that Bin Ladin avoid linking himself direct public anti-US speeches in recent months, including multiple states involvement in the USS Cole bombing, indicate he no longer feels constraints.	nents implying
	The war in Chechnya and violence between Israelis and Palestinians competition for funding and recruits among Sunni extremists during ratcheting up pressure on Bin Ladin to mount an attack soon	
	ne passage of a week since the warning that an attack would occur within of signal a diminished danger. Other threats	one or two days does
pl	point to a longer time frame anned for a later date.	more attacks are
	Bin Ladin's operatives closely monitor security measures at their int may have delayed an attack until conditions are more favorable or a identified.	
im sta an	n Ladin's increasingly inflammatory rhetoric may be intended to ensure he pending attacks and to reinforce his image in the event of US retaliation and unding up to US aggression. Bin Ladin must make an especially strong caranti-Israeli attack, which might otherwise be attributed to other terrorists zballah or Palestinian groups.	as a heroic figure se to receive credit for
_		hour out made, for ITC
	airstrikes	hey are ready for US
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	SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF	
	2 July 2001	
	Terrorism: Planning for Bin Ladin Attacks Continues, Despite Delay	
	Attacks planned by Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization may have been delayed by	
	heightened US security the attacks will occur soon.	·
	ine attacks will occur soon.	<b>_</b>
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	necessary to pursue jihad against	
	Americans and that operations would soon be carried out against US and Jewish interests,	
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		SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIGENCE BRIEF	
		13 July 2001	•
	Terrorism: Bin L	Ladin Plans Delayed but Not Abandoned	
. [		results could	i Still
_	be expected		
	operations	US security measures would d	elav
		but that plans to attack are still in train.	<del></del>
		unspecified things were moving at a fast pace	<b>,</b>
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	SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTELLIG	GENCE BRIEF	·
Terrorism: One Bin	Ladin Operation Delayed, Othe	rs Ongoing	
Ladin-sponsored terrs	orist operation has been postpone	i <u>ndicates that an Usam</u> d	a Bin
planned but had been o			still
plantos out ma oout			7
6.4		results still w	ould be
forthcoming			
	for terrorist operations against L	us activity continued late	

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	TOPSEGRET	20 12555 5.5(6)
	SENIOR EXECUTIVE INTE	I I IGENCE RRIEE
	7 August 20	_ ·
•		
	Terrorism: Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in th	e US
		indicate Usama Bin
	Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist att television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his follow Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousef and "bring the fi	ers would follow the example of World
	A service reported that Bi operative's access to the US to mount a terror	n Ladin was planning to exploit an ist strike.
·	The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may has attempt at a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plot the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport has Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.	ter Ahmed Ressam says that he conceived imself, but also that Bin Ladin lieutenant
•	Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los	Angeles operation
• .	His attacks on the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanz operations years in advance and is not deterred by se Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 19 planning the bombings were arrested and deported in	tbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled the 193, and some members of the Nairobi cell
	Al-Qa'ida members, including some US citizens, hav	e resided in or traveled to the US for
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.
	years, and the group apparently maintains a support found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb the US Embass senior Egyptian Islamic Jihad member lived in Califor A Bin Ladin cell in New York in 1998 was reco	structure here. Two al-Qa'ida members sies in East Africa were US citizens, and a nia in the mid-1990s.

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	THE D	DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTI	ELLIGENCE	
		WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505	•	
			4 December 1998	٠
•	MEMORANDUM FOR:	Deputy Director of Central Deputy Director of Central Community Management	Intelligence for t	
	•	Associate Director of Cent Military Support Executive Director	nan intelligence tol	
		Deputy Director for Operat Deputy Director for Intellige		
, ,	SUBJECT:	Usama Bin Ladin		
		•		
4	2. We must infrastructure, followers, f	now redouble our efforts agai finances, etc. with a sense of	inst Bin Ladin himself, his enormous urgency.	· · ·
	no longer be solely relied	acknowledge that our efforts upon to bring Bin Laden to just paths simultaneously. This	can-	
	a. Discussion	ons with all liaison services wi der Bin Ladin to justice.		
·	b. Active an provide the military purposes against B	nd immediate efforts to ensure with timely and accurate info	that we are able to rmation for targeting	
·				
	c. Immediat	e operational exploitation, pla	nning and threat warning	]
	node en	both unilaterally a	and in concert with liaison	
•	partners.			<del>-</del>
<b>(</b>	parmers.			
	partners.			

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liaison relations which have the potential for greatest gain and recontact at senior levels.

- e. We need to immediately push the rest of the collection community to make Bin Ladin and his infrastructure our top priority. I want Charlie Alien to immediately chair a meeting with NSA, NIMA, CITO, and others—to ensure that we are doing everything we can to meet CTC's requirements.
- f. I want to know that we are pursuing all available conventional and special collection methods to get after Bin Ladin, his infrastructure, people and money.
- g. We need an immediate engagement with Special Operations Command and all DoD collection assets/programs, SAPs, etc. which may be of assistance to our efforts.
- 4. <del>(TS)</del> We need an integrated plan which captures these elements and others which may be appropriate. This plan must be fully coordinated with the FBI.
- 5. <del>(TS).</del> We are at war. The DDCI will chair the group to coordinate the actions proposed above and any other actions which may be possible. I want no resources or people spared in this effort, either inside CIA or the Community.

George J. Tenet

cc: Counselor to the DCI

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Declassified and Approved for Release, 10 April 2004

## Bin Ladin Determined To Strike in US



Clandestine, foreign government, and media reports indicate Bin Ladin since 1997 has wanted to conduct terrorist attacks in the US. Bin Ladin implied in US television interviews in 1997 and 1998 that his followers would follow the example of World Trade Center bomber Ramzi Yousel and "bring the lighting to America."

	strikes on his base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Ladin e wanted to retaliate in Washington, according to
8	service.
An Fovotian l	mic lihad (FLI) operative told an service

An Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ) operative told an service at the same time that Bin Ladin was planning to exploit the operative's access to the US to mount a terrorist strike.

The millennium plotting in Canada in 1999 may have been part of Bin Ladin's first serious attempt to implement a terrorist strike in the US. Convicted plotter Ahmed Ressam has told the FBI that he conceived the idea to attack Los Angeles International Airport himself, but that Bin Ladin lieutenant Abu Zubaydah encouraged him and helped facilitate the operation. Ressam also said that in 1998 Abu Zubaydah was planning his own US attack.

Ressam says Bin Ladin was aware of the Los Angeles operation.

Although Bin Ladin has not succeeded, his attacks against the US Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998 demonstrate that he preparas operations years in advance and is not deterred by setbacks. Bin Ladin associates surveilled our Embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam as early as 1993, and some members of the Nairobi cell planning the bombings were arrested and deported in 1997.

Al-Qa'ida members—including some who are US citizens—have resided in or traveled to the US for years, and the group apparently maintains a support structure that could ald attacks. Two al-Qa'ida members found guilty in the conspiracy to bomb our Embassies in East Africa were US citizens, and a senior EIJ member lived in California in the mid-1990s.

A clandestine source said in 1998 that a Bin Ladin cell in New York was recruiting Muslim-American youth for attacks.

We have not been able to corroborate some of the more sensational threat reporting, such as that from a service in 1998 saying that Bin Ladin wanted to hijack a US aircraft to gain the release of "Blind Shaykh" 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman and other US-held extremists.

continued

For the President Only

ROVED FOR 6 August 2001

Declassified and Approved for Release, 10 April 2004

APPROVED FOR RELEASEL DATE: 25-April-2012


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	Declassified and Approved for Release, 10 April 2004
	<ul> <li>Nevertheless, FBI information since that time indicates patterns of suspicious activity in this country consistent with preparations for hijackings or other types of attacks, including recent surveillance of federal buildings in New York.</li> </ul>
	The FBI is conducting approximately 70 full field investigations throughout the US that it considers Bin Ladin-related. CIA and the FBI are investigating a call to our Embassy in the UAE in May saying that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was in the US planning attacks with explosives.
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	For the President Only 6 August 2001  Declassified and Approve for Release, 10 April 20

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	DCI Counterterrorist	TOP SECRET
- CTC	Center	
		ERTERRORIST CENTER COMMENTARY
	Intelligence Agency	
		· ·
		6 January 1997
	Terrorism: Usama B	in Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?
		Summary
		•
	container of uranium	agents of Usama Bin Ladin purchased a
	committee by aransam	
		ogus nuclear material
	use weapons of mass de agents and biological to	ggests he is taking steps to develop the capability to struction (WMD)—possibly involving chemical xins as well as nuclear material—for terrorist to give these substances to supporters.
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	Pursuing WMD?	
	effort by Bin Ladin's agents in 1994	to purchase uranium:
		in a metallic cylinder
. [	bogus weapons-gr	ade nuclear material
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
C05373665 TOP SECRE information from the past several years tying Bin Ladin to other efforts to acquire WMD capabilities: was exploring the possibility of mounting operations with WMD. To What End? Bin Ladin's stated intention to undertake hostile acts against the US presence in the Persian Gulf regionbased as it is on an implacable antipathy toward the United States-could be abetted strongly by access to WMD material. In public statements made in late November, Bin Ladin warned that "qualitative operations" would be necessary to pursue "a real battle between the Islamic Nation and US forces." We do not know exactly what Bin Ladin might be threatening or how serious he is about following threats with action. targeting US interests in the Persian Gulf. 3 TOP SECRET





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


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Subject: Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?
Distribution:
Distribution. External Department of State
1 - Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State, Diplomatic Security 1 - Gree Buiec, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security
1 - Robert J. Einhorn, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Nonproliferation,
Political-Military Affairs Bureau
1 - Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research
1 - Arthur H. Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
1 - Daniel C. Kurtzer, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence and
Research 1 - Amb, E. Gibson Lanpher, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asian
Affairs Affairs
·
1 - Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Attairs 1 - Robin Raphel, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs
1 - Peter Tarnoff, Under Secretary for Political Affairs
1 - Toni G. Verstandig, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
1 - C. David Welch, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
1 - Amb. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism
1 - Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs
Vational Security Council 1 - R. Rand Beers, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Intelligence Programs  1 - Samuel R. Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
1 - Samuel K. Berger, Deputy Assistant to the Fresident for Ivational Security Attans

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


1 - Richard A. Clarke, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Global Issues and Multinational Affairs
1 - Steven Grummon, Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs 1 - Elisa Harris Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls
I - Richard LeBaron, Director, Near East and South Asian Affairs  1 - Mark Parris, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near
East and South Asian Affairs  I - Gary Samore, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Nonproliferation and Export Controls
<ul> <li>1 - Steven Simon, Director of Counterterrorism</li> <li>1 - Nancy E. Soderberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</li> </ul>
Office of the Vice President
1 - Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs
Department of Defense
I - MajGen John P. Casciano, Assistant Chief of Statt, Air Force Intelligence
1 - BGen. James Conway, Deputy Director of Operations for Combating Terrorism,
I - BGen, Larry I. Dodgen, Denuty Assistant Secretary Missions & Policy, SOLIC
1 - H. Allen Holmes, Assistant Secretary, Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict
1 - LTG Patrick M. Hughes. Director, Defense Intelligence Agency
1 - MG James C. King, Director J-2, Joint Staff Intelligence 1 - Gen. Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps
I - Lt. Gen. Peter Pace, USMC, Director, J-3 Operations
1 - Bruce Riedel, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs
1 - Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy





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
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	Counterterrorist Center
- CTC	Central COUNTERTERRORIST CENTER COMMENTARY
	Central Intelligence Agency
	6 Ionus 1000
	6 January 1997
	Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?
	Summary
	agents of Usama Bin Ladin purchased a container of uranium
	bogus nuclear material
	efforts by Bin Ladin suggests he is taking steps to develop the capability to
	use weapons of mass destruction (WMI))-possibly involving chamical
	use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)—possibly involving chemical agents and biological toxins as well as nuclear material—for terrorist operations, or may plan to give these substances to supporters.
	use weapons of mass destruction (WMD)-possibly involving chemical agents and biological toxins as well as nuclear material-for terrories
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
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	Pursuing WMD?			·		
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
C05373665 TOP SECRET information from the past several years tying Bin Ladin to other efforts to acquire WMD capabilities: was exploring the possibility of mounting operations with WMD. To What End? Bin Ladin's stated intention to undertake hostile acts against the US presence in the Persian Gulf regionbased as it is on an implacable antipathy toward the United States--could be abetted strongly by access to WMD material. • In public statements made in late November, Bin Ladin warned that "qualitative operations" would be necessary to pursue "a real battle between the Islamic Nation and US forces." We do not know exactly what Bin Ladin might be threatening or how serious he is about following threats with action. targeting US interests in the Persian Gulf. 3





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TOP SECRET
Subject: Terrorism: Usama Bin Ladin Trying to Develop WMD Capability?
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Department of State
1 - Eric J. Boswell, Assistant Secretary of State, Diplomatic Security 1 - Greg Buiac, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Diplomatic Security
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1 - Toby T. Gati, Assistant Secretary of State for Intelligence and Research 1 - Arthur H. Hughes, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern Affairs
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I - Robert Pelletreau, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs
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1 - Amb. Philip C. Wilcox, Jr., Coordinator for Counterterrorism
1 - Timothy E. Wirth, Under Secretary for Global Affairs  National Security Council
1 - R. Rand Beers, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Intelligence Programs  1 - Samuel R. Berger, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs




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17 July 1992

MEMORANDUM FOR: National Foreign Intelligence Board

FROM:

Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT:

Warning

- 1. I have reviewed the report of the Task Force on Improving Intelligence Warning and believe that the Task Force has done the Intelligence Community an important service both in highlighting the deficiencies in the present warning system and also in making proposals for a new and invigorated approach to this problem.
- 2. In keeping with the report of the Task Force, but also drawing on a number of the very useful comments that have been provided from throughout the Community, I have decided the following:
  - -- First, appropos of both the Task Force report and a 4 number of comments, warning needs to be futher defined in order to make the system work and be responsive. Warning is not the same as the entire universe of contemporary intelligence. The term "warning," as it applies to intelligence, means to sound an alarm, to give notice, to give admonishing advice to policymakers. It connotes urgency and implies the potential need for policy action in response. It is a different intelligence function than simply informing policymakers or enhancing their understanding of an issue or development. For the purposes of this decision memorandum, warning would include identifying or forecasting events that could cause the engagement of US military forces (from the scale of embassy evacuations to larger military activities) and of events that would have a sudden deleterious effect on US foreign policy and security (e.g., coups, third party wars, refugee surges, and so The National Intelligence Warning function should be limited to possible developments no more than six months in the future.
  - In keeping with Recommendation 1 of the Task Force report, I explicitly endorse a comprehensive strategy for the Community, including improved Community-wide support to the DCI in this connection; improved accountability for warning intelligence efforts through the clear assignment of responsibilities and periodic performance

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evaluations; establishment of an integrated analytical program for warning intelligence production combining both line units and elements dedicated to warning assessments; the sharing of Community-wide alternative warning assessments; and improved quality of intelligence warning analysis through sustained training of analysts augmented by methodology research.

- -- The NIO for Warning (NIO/W) will continue to serve as my and the Community's principal advisor on warning. This individual will be the principal substantive advisor on warning issues to the DCI and to the NFIB, and will provide advice to each of the NFIP components on their respective roles and postures for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. The duties of this officer will include:
  - Assure that the DCI is provided intelligence warning, in a timely manner, that is relevant to senior policymakers' interests and to national level policy issues. The NIO/W's primary responsibility in this sphere is to ensure that a process is in place that supports the DCI with warning assessments on a Community-wide basis--a process that results in: assessments that are full-ranged regarding all reasonably possible scenarios; assessments that are either prepared by or under the NIOs' direction, or that include their views; and that allow the NIO/W to add his or her personal assessment when the NIO/W judges the Community product to be incomplete or even misleading.
  - Influence warning-related intelligence collection both informally and through the National Intelligence Collection Board.
  - Assure that timely intelligence warnings are disseminated to consumers in a progressive fashion, keyed to the pace of a developing situation.
  - Provide guidance to warning elements of Community components to ensure that all their efforts are mutually complementary, inclusive of the needs of all priority consumers, and responsive to the strategic objectives cited above.

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- Monitor the operations of these Community component warning elements within the context of their participation in the National Intelligence Warning System, particularly with respect to sharing new and alternative warning assessments and supporting the preparation of national warning products.
- Advise the NFIP principals and the directors of their components on their operational roles, training programs and overall posture for supporting the National Warning System.
- Coordinate closely with the designated warning elements of the Intelligence Community.
- Report periodically to the DCI, the NFIC and other concerned departments on the Community's performance with respect to intelligence warning as well as on future warning intelligence requirements.

I am not persuaded that it is necessary at this point to create another Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council to carry out the warning function. I intend to give the NIO/W the authority necessary to carry out the responsibilities described above. If that proves insufficient, then changes in status can always be made.

- -- Each major NFIP component should establish or designate an element whose mission is to act as the focal point for warning within that organization and to work with its counterparts in other organizations that collectively constitute the National Intelligence Warning System. These elements will constitute the Warning Community and will remain under the operational control and management of their parent organizations, but should be responsive to the general guidance provided by the NIO/W. These organizations should:
  - Perform and monitor investigative intelligence analyses directed at identifying and/or tracking potential warning concerns, in response to guidance provided by, among others, the NIO/W.

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- Make internal line units aware of the dynamic warning interests of consumers in order to better posture these units for initiating warning assessments that are timely and relevant to consumer interests.
- Act as the organization in question's agent for sharing new and alternative warning assessments, and related time sensitive intelligence, with all counterparts in the interagency warning intelligence network and with the NIO/W.
- Ensure that tailored collection requirements are initiated, and encompass all reasonably possible scenarios that could generate high threat warnings.
- Support the preparation of national warning products by directly participating in their production or by supporting other elements within their organization in their preparation of such products.
- Facilitate the establishment of warning intelligence training programs and the development and appropriate use of warning intelligence methodologies within their organization.
- -- As suggested by the Task Force, there should be the following additional structural changes to the current operation of the National Intelligence Warning System. All major Community components should adopt or reinstitute the practice of designating an officer-presumably the director of its warning element-with specific responsibilities for supporting the National Intelligence Warning System. The National Warning Staff should be transferred to the NIO/W as enhanced support staff. The duties of individual members of this staff should be defined in a complementary fashion so that the NIO/W is assisted by functional experts in his or her many responsibilities. This staff will be co-located with the NIO/W.
- 3. An essential change in the warning system is that it not exist in isolation from and parallel to the remainder of the analytical and collection community. It is also imperative that



SUBJECT: Warning

the warning system trigger actions by the rest of the Community, with respect to both analysis and collection. There must be a mechanism for vetting warning in such a way as to avoid a significant number of false alarms and at the same time ensure that its warnings cannot simply be brushed aside either within the Intelligence Community or the policy community. Accordingly:


- -- Warning reports may be initiated either by the NIO/W or, through him, by any warning element of the Intelligence Community.
- -- Warning reports growing out of the National Intelligence Warning System will be sent in the first instance to the DCI and principals of the National Foreign Intelligence Board. Mechanisms should be created to ensure that such reports are delivered directly to the NFIB principals within the minimum possible amount of time, for example one to two hours after their completion.
- -- Upon receipt of the warning report, NFIB agencies will provide to the NIO/W a written reaction to the warning report according to a schedule established by the NIO/W, depending on the urgency of the matter. Simultaneously, the Community Management Staff Deputy for Requirements and Evaluation will provide a report to the NIO/W on the status of collection relating to the subject of the warning report.
- -- The NIO/W will summarize these materials (and forward the reactions as well) for the DCI. Depending on the urgency of the matter, the DCI (or the DDCI in his absence) may authorize the dissemination of the warning report to the policy community.
- -- The DCI will then decide whether to commission a National Intelligence Estimate on the issue. The warning NIE would address a single warning issue and would be the product of the NIO/W in coordination with the appropriate NIO or NIOs and members of the analytic communities.
- -- Authorization of dissemination of a warning report to the policy community or the commissioning of a warning NIE will include direction to intensify collection activities on the subject at hand. Warning-related collection management will be enhanced and focused by the appropriate intelligence agencies. The NIO/W will monitor these collection enhancements.

- -- With dissemination of a Warning Report or Warning Estimate, the National Intelligence Collection Board will meet to decide on steps for enhancing focused collection on the warning subject.
- -- Following the issuance of a warning NIE, the NIO/W may, with the approval of DCI or DDCI, issue a National Intelligence Warning Spot Report to keep pace with and identify warning situations.
- -- Every six months, the Vice Chairman of the National Intelligence Council for Evaluation will examine the production of the National Warning System and report to the DCI and NFIB on the performance of the system and experience during the preceding period.
- 4. The weekly "Watch Report" meeting henceforth will be chaired by the NTO/W, with other participants remaining unchanged.
- 5. It is important in the warning process that regional NIOs and the line analytical elements of the Intelligence Community be involved, at a minimum, in dialogue by the NIO/W to ensure that the DCI is advised not only of the views of the NIO/W, but those of the line analytic components as well.
- 6. The measures I have described above should be implemented immediately. The Chairman of the National Intelligence Council will provide a report to the DCI and NFIB principals in 90 days on the establishment of the new National Warning System, together with recommendations for further refinement and adjustments to improve performance.

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## Islamic Extremist Learns to Fly

- → Islamic fundamental signaves to US to learn to fly a 747 in Minnesona
- → Pays for training in each
- → Interested to learn that 747 doors don't open in flight
- → Wanted training on landor like fights
- → FBI arresied him based on the lact that he overstaved his 90 day visa

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[Begin Bin-Ladin recording] The only way to defeat this humiliation and infidelity, which prevails in the land of Islam, is through jihad, bullets, and martyrdom operations. [end recording]

In the desert of Qandahar, we were able to meet Usamah Bin-Ladin. The meeting was attended by Ayman <u>al[0]</u>-Zawahiri, leader of the Egyptian <u>Al[0]</u>-Jama'ah <u>al[0]</u>-Islamiyah, which recently joined Usamah Bin-Ladin's group, forming what is now known as the <u>Al[0]-Qa'idah[0]</u> Organization. The meeting was also attended by Usamah Bin-Ladin's right-hand man, Abu-Hafs, who preferred not to appear on camera.

The journey to the headquarters of Usamah Bin-Ladin in the Qandahar desert from the center of the city of Qandahar lasted for three hours. We were taken to the headquarters of Usamah Bin-Ladin in a car with darkened windows. Following strict security measures and thorough search we were allowed to meet Usamah.

Bin-Ladin was happy at the statements of his followers that the next weeks will witness important surprises and that US and Israeli interests in the world will be targeted. He refused to make any comment on this because the Taleban Movement bans him from making any press statements.

[Begin Taleban Foreign Minister Wakil Ahmad Mutawakkil recording] The government of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan will never allow any person to use its territory to strike against or threaten the interests of any country in the world. It will also not allow that its country be used for any terrorist action. [end recording]

Observers believe that the current tension between Usamah Bin-Ladin and the United States could lead to an explosion that could take place at any moment, especially since the US troops stationed in the Middle East have been put on a state of alert for fear of an attack or in preparation for a military strike against Usamah Bin-Ladin's positions.

Abu-Hafs, Bin-Ladin's right-hand man, told us: We are ready for any surprise. We are ready to vacate our positions in less than half an hour if the United States attempts to bomb our positions.

[Begin Bin-Ladin recording] Men should send their sons to the fields of battle and confrontation so that they can receive military training to champion the religion of [Prophet] Muhammad, may God's peace and blessings be upon him. [end recording]

The coming days will answer the question: Who will strike first and what form will it take?

- 1. click here to view bin-ladin's followers defusing a bomb
- 2. <u>click here to view bin-ladin's men in training and bin-ladin speaking with a map behind him</u>
- 3. <u>click here to view bin-lading and al-zawahiri sitting next to each other and speaking to mbc correspondent</u>
  - 4. click here to view bin-ladin sitting at a table and speaking into a microphone

8/12/03 3	_

•	iew bin-ladin's men in training iew bin-ladin speaking into a microphone
	iew bin-ladin's men storming a house with rifles in their hands
the Arab World]  THIS REPORT MAY CO	ce: London MBC Television in Arabic Saudi-Financed, Covering Events in ONTAIN COPYRIGHTED MATERIAL. COPYING AND DISSEMINATION IS PROHIBITED NOF THE COPYRIGHT OWNERS.
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY	DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
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Fraudulently Acquired Saudi Passpor	rts Facilitate Al-Qa'ida Travel
	6 December 2002
Al-Qa'ida uses fraudulently acquired Saudi passports to document its operatives and facilitate international	
travel	\.
Some of the passports are stolen issued to terrorists under false	
pretense.	
Forgers fraudulently issue or alter these passports to	
create false identities, impersonate other citizens, and conceal suspicious travel.	
Conceat suspicious navel.	
	·
Thousands of Saudi Passports Lost or Stolen	
Saudi passports have been lost or	
stolen in recent years	Saudi blanks are particularly problematic because they lack the document control number normally used
	for tracking their disposition before issuance.
This report was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist	Center
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EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs	
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	Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?
Key Findings (U)	Al-Qa'ida used its sanctuary and network of training facilities in Afghanistan not only to impart the skills necessary to carry out terrorist operations and jihad but also to select and vet terrorist recruits, foster a jihadist lifestyle, build commitment to the cause, and develop liaison relationships with other groups.
	Al-Qa'ida's Afghanistan camps played a central, if not a crucial role in the planning of the 11 September attacks and in the selection and training of cadres to execute the plot.
	<ul> <li>In their Afghanistan haven, the organizers and masterminds were able to exchange views at length in face-to-face meetings as the plot took final shape in the Ramadan 1999/2000 time period.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>The in-person meetings greatly reduced the risk of discovery that more remote communications—by cell phone or Internet, for example—would have entailed.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Although al-Qa'ida could still exploit the open society in the United States to repeat a terrorist act on the scale and with the complexity of 11 September, it will be much harder to assemble as well-trained and carefully selected a team as the 19 hijackers without a safehaven comparable to Afghanistan.</li> </ul>
	A variety of sources suggest that, after the plot was set in motion in December 1999, the selection process for members of the "second wave" of hijackers—the support team for the pilots—also took place in Afghanistan and that it involved direct contact with the al-Qa'ida leadership, including Bin Ladin.
·	and that Bin Ladin personally interviewed and assessed each applicant.
	in the past year al-Qa'ida has set up small, temporary pockets of training in
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Afghanistan Camps Central to 11 September Plot: Can Al-Qa'ida Train on the Run?	
The Role of Afghanistan (U)	Southeast Asia—to help set up training programs.
Al-Qa'ida's training facilities in Afghanistan served	
multiple functions—from allowing Bin Ladin to forge	
the organization to acting as the crucible for the	planning and implementation of complex operations,
11 September plot. The Afghan training system:	including the 11 September attacks. Our analysis, one-and-a-half years after the attacks, indicates the
• Imparted the skills necessary to carry out terrorist	plot was conceived and almost entirely directed from
operations and fight in jihad.	Afghanistan. The safehaven played a key role in the
Allowed careful selection and vetting of terrorist	planning and execution of the operation, including the hijackers' selection, indoctrination, training, and
recruits and operatives by the most senior members	initiation into the plot. Even the plot's relatively
of the organization.	autonomous senior coordinator, Muhammad Atta,
- Fostand a likedist lifestule among all mamiles	relayed his updates on the situation in the United States and recommendations for changes in the plan
<ul> <li>Fostered a jihadist lifestyle among all recruits, allowing al-Qa'ida leaders to meld men of widely</li> </ul>	to Afghanistan, seeking the input of the al-Qa'ida
varied backgrounds and nationalities into a focused, single-minded corps.	leadership.
and the second second	Targeted Candidates Like many other eventual al-Qa'ida members, the
Provided the isolation and psychological atmosphere necessary to support classic	11 September hijackers were targeted for recruitment
brainwashing techniques that turned recruits into	outside of Afghanistan, primarily in Germany and
committed operatives who—like several of the	Saudi Arabia, according to a variety of reporting.  Al-Qa'ida recruiters, trusted clerics, and family
11 September hijackers—could be trusted to live for several years in the West and still carry out their mission.	recommendations played roles in spotting candidates.
A10 !!	Muhammad Heydar Zammar, an extremist with
Al-Qa'ida used its Afghanistan camps as currency to increase its influence with other terrorist groups and	suspected al-Qa'ida connections recruited three of the four pilots—
to build an international network of trained Islamic	Muhammed Atta, Marwan al-Shehhi, and Ziad
terrorists to which al-Qa'ida could later turn for	Jarrah
support for its operations. According to various intelligence reporting, among the groups that trained	
in al-Qa'ida camps in the past are al-Gama'at	Nawaf al-Hazmi probably recommended his
al-Islamiyya, Jemaah Islamiya (JI)	brother, Salim al-Hazmi, for recruitment
A1 O-1941-	
Al-Qa'ida also sent trainers to other groups—particularly those in	
This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterror	rist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis
Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed	d to
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Several of the Saudis appear to have been recruited from Saudi universities or mosques.  Gathering in Afghanistan Travel to Afghanistan was a critical step in turning al-Qa'ida recruits into committed terrorists. The experience of travel to the "pure Islamic state," the camaraderie among recruits, and the discipline and commitment exhibited by al-Qa'ida instructors had a powerful influence.	better match individuals to specific operations and operational environments and chose those best able to blend into the target country.  five pilot candidates for the 11 September plot were selected during Ramadan meetings in 1999 with al-Qa'ida's senior leadership in Kandahar. Three were the Hamburgbased hijackers and the remaining two were hijacker Nawaf al-Hazmi and facilitator Ramzi Bin al-Shibh.
to it. The time spent in Afghanistan mobilized, radicalized, and transformed the youth  All 19 hijackers, as well as several of the plot's main facilitators, spent time in al-Qa'ida training facilities and guesthouses in Afghanistan during the two years before the September 2001 attacks	A variety of sources suggest that, after the plot was set in motion in December 1999, the selection process for members of the "second wave" of hijackers also took place in the Afghanistan camps and that it was thorough and involved direct contact with the al-Qa'ida leadership, including Bin Ladin  We do not know how many potential suicide attackers were evaluated when the team that carried out the 11 September attacks was chosen, but it was a large number
• The visits of the four pilots to Afghanistan were short relative to those of the "second wave"—the support team for the pilots. Some of the second wave made more than one trip and most stayed many months in the training camps.  Selection  According to a variety of intelligence reporting, while men were recruited worldwide, actual selection into the ranks of al-Qa'ida occurred only in Afghanistan, after the organization had ample opportunity to observe candidates' performances in training. In Afghanistan, senior planners observed recruits to	number of men passing through the Afghan training camps allowed al-Qa'ida to be selective.  Controlled Training Most of the hijackers underwent training similar to that given other al-Qa'ida recruits. The al-Faruq training camp west of Kandahar appears to have been the preferred location for the training and vetting of most second-wave hijackers probably because of its proximity to Bin Ladin and the senior al-Qa'ida leadership. Of the 12 young Saudi hijackers who were in Afghanistan concurrently during the spring of

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2001, at least seven underwent the basic training regime at al-Faruq.

 Three other Saudis—Khalid al-Mihdhar, Satam al-Suqami, and Majid Muqid—trained at Khaldan, another large basic regime training camp that was located in Paktia Province south of Kabul.

Al-Qa'ida instructors conducted training in stages designed to winnow out all but the best and most reliable recruits.

- According to a variety of intelligence reporting, all recruits received standardized basic training, including training in firearms, heavy weapons, explosives, and topography. Recruits learned discipline and military life and were subjected to artificial stresses designed to measure their psychological fitness and commitment to jihad. After the initial stage of training, al-Qa'ida instructors chose candidates to be suicide operatives and others physically and emotionally capable of advancing to the next level.
- Advanced training focused on tactical classes, such as explosives handling and detonation, sabotage, and kidnapping. Al-Qa'ida's philosophy was taught along with advanced theological training.
   Al-Qa'ida also offered this training to recruits from other terrorist groups

Specialized training—such as surveillance, urban warfare techniques, and the manufacture of explosives—was reserved for al-Qa'ida members who had been selected to participate in terrorist operations and who had pledged bay'at (an oath) to Bin Ladin. Facilitators received tailored training consistent with their specialties, and operatives received training tailored to the specific operations,

The second wave of hijackers engaged in monthslong, daily, intensive instruction, which included

martial arts, ideological and religious indoctrination, and familiarization with procedures that would allow them to blend in with their surroundings in the United States. They likely were put through physical endurance tests, including food and water deprivation, to test their dedication to the cause and ability to withstand captivity—a common practice at al-Oa'ida training camps.

easier to conduct martial arts and operational security training, which the second-wave hijackers acquired as a team with their future coconspirators, in the controlled environment of the training camps in Afghanistan than in a classroom.

To prevent backsliding among the second-wave hijackers, the al-Qa'ida trainers in Afghanistan used brainwashing techniques to cement their loyalty and discouraged them from contacting their families during and after their stay in Afghanistan

instance of backsliding by a hijacker candidate.

al-Hamlan, who trained in Afghanistan in the summer of 2000 and swore an oath of allegiance to Bin Ladin, apparently had second thoughts after he made an unapproved visit to his family while on a trip to Saudi Arabia with hijacker Ahmad al-Nami. The two had been instructed to get US visas from the Consulate in Jedda, but al-Hamlan felt misgivings about the suicide mission after speaking with a brother and refused to return with al-Nami to Afghanistan.

Afghanistan offered the second-wave hijackers the opportunity to cement their personal ties and loyalties to each other in a relatively secure location as they absorbed the skills needed to execute the plot. Senior planners could observe potential operatives and assemble a team with complimentary skills. Bin Ladin suggested that the hijacker teams in each aircraft comprise individuals who knew each other well and had formed close bonds during training to

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Facilitators and Associates Several of the plot's key facilitators and members of the Hamburg network also trained in Afghanistan. Like the second-wave hijackers, the visits of the associates and facilitators took place after the Hamburg pilots' travel to Kandahar in late 1999. The Hamburg associates may have made these trips to Afghanistan so that the al-Qa'ida leadership could personally assess their trustworthiness and utility to the unfolding plot.  • Mounir al-Motassadeq, convicted in Germany for his role in supporting the conspiracy, admitted at his trial to having been in Afghanistan from June to August 2000.	discovering that it was cheaper and shorter in duration than similar training in Europe.  • The three Hamburg pilots used the Internet to research flight schools in the United States, to submit applications for training and, having arrived in the United States, to order flight deck videos from an aviation store in Ohio.  • Al-Qa'ida's continued interest, even after 11 September, in obtaining this kind of training is clear from the discovery of flight training brochures in some of the Afghanistan training camps after the fall of the Taliban.  Picking Up the Pieces (U)  Al-Qa'ida today can draw on numerous resources to provide training outside Afghanistan. The organization trained people in its camps in Afghanistan from 1996 until 2001.  Experienced trainers from Afghanistan's camps are now scattered
Zaccarias Moussaoui, whose role in the     11 September plot is still being determined, visited     Afghanistan in April 1998 and later that year,     August through October 1999, and again in     December 2000.  Flight Training (U)  although Muhammad 'Atif instructed the three     Hamburg pilots to enroll in flight training, he did not     specify where. Plot senior coordinator Muhammad     Atta had enough decisionmaking latitude to seek     flight instruction in the United States, upon	The group has extensive contacts with other terrorist groups, including many that are in debt to al-Qa'ida for past aid.  • Al-Qa'ida can utilize a variety of venues for small training programs, including madrasas refugee camps, secluded compounds in areas under limited government control, schools, mosques, and even apartments.  • Al-Qa'ida sympathizers are also increasingly taking to the Internet to disseminate training materials, such as poison manuals, and conduct online training

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	We have no information indicating that al-Qa'ida has been able to recreate anything approaching the large-
	scale training program it once had in Afghanistan.
	-
	however, that al-Qa'ida in the past year and a half has
tamasamusing mali m anghunisman 1916. akéa magudintan daramitanyawa mutus	conducted or attempted to conduct short-term, small- scale training in areas where it has a presence. For
and the second of the second o	example:
	Al-Qa'ida and local extremist groups have trained
Thus into early after the are envenies—of a second of the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping and the enveloping are the enveloping and the enveloping are the enveloping and the enveloping are the enveloping and the enveloping are the enveloping a	in Pakistani border regions in preparation for launching operations against US and coalition
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	Outlook (U)
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C05433003 TOPSECRE Al-Qa'ida can feed off the fruits of its past labor in Afghanistan to continue conducting operations and conduct small-scale training in the near term. It probably will be relatively easy to covertly train small groups of terrorists in the skills necessary to conduct operations. The training of a handful of operatives will be difficult to detect. The orchestration of major attacks, however, will become increasingly difficult without a new safehaven that would give the al-Qa'ida leadership the freedom to operate and control the plotting. Without the Afghanistan camps to continue training thousands of men, al-Qa'ida will have a smaller pool of recruits to choose from. Moreover, if al-Qa'ida is not able to exercise firm control over its training programs, conduct consecutive courses, and have its senior leaders observe and vet new trainees, it will be more difficult to bring adequately trained new recruits into the organization. Moreover, those who are brought into the group may not enjoy the full • Over the long run, the failure to find a safehaven in confidence of al-Qa'ida's senior planners to operate which to reestablish its training programs will affect independently over long periods of time with the nature of al-Qa'ida's organization and the unwavering commitment to the cause. broader extremist community and al-Qa'ida's standing among associated terrorist groups. · Al-Qa'ida may lose leverage over allies as the global antiterrorist campaign further degrades its ability to provide financial, logistic, and training support to allied groups and to its own fighters.

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#### **DCI Counterterrorist Center**

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# Attack on the USS Cole: Preliminary Findings 10 November 2000

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
## Key Assessment

- → Attack on the USS Cole was carried out by a cell comprised of residents of Yemen, some with family ties to Saudi Arabia and to the transnational (mujahidin) network.
- → Cell likely had support from Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization.
  - · Assessment based on the identities of key suspects in the plot.
  - Intelligence links the key suspects and the operation to al-Qa'ida.

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## Suspects' Links to UBL/Mujahidin

- → Intelligence reporting indicates that each suspects has ties to the transnational mujahidin network and/or al-Qa ida
  - Hassan al-Khamn
  - · Jamal al-Badawi

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### Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri

→ Abd al-Rahim al-Nashiri figured prominently in Africa Embassy bombing investigation and the 1998 plot to smuggle "Sagger missiles into Saudi Arabia.

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
## Other Intelligence Pointing to a UBL Role


plans for an operation against US Navy by a Bin Ladin-affiliated group.

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# Gaps in the Bin Ladin Case

→ Caveats:


of suspects

Intelligence reporting on the command and control aspects of the operation is not conclusive.

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C05432023 (b)(1)(b)(3)EO 12958 1.4(b)<25Yrs EO 12958 1.4(c)<25Yrs EO 12958 1.4(d)<25Yrs EO 12958 3.5(c) The Director of Central Intelligence Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism Community Counterterrorism Board 18 October 2000 INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY TERRORIST THREAT ASSESSMENT The Threat to US Personnel in Yemen Summary (U) The potential for terrorist attacks against US personnel responding to the USS Cole bombing in Aden. Yemen. is high. Attacks may originate from .:: terrorist groups seeking to exploit high-profile targets as well as local extremists opposed to the US presence in Aden Terrorist Presence (U) Aden presents a potentially hostile environment for US Government personnel responding to the attack on the USS Cole. Several transnational terrorist groups-including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization maintain a presence in Yemen including some who have targeted US interests in Aden. In December 1998 the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA), an offshoot of the Yemen Islamic Jihad (XII) with ties to transnational Islamic extremists, kidnapped: 16 Western tourists, his prompting a government rescue effort which resulted in the death of four captives. There Islamic Army previously had claimed allegiance to Usama Bin Ladin: The IAA had targeted US and UK tourists for kidnapping in part to force the Yemeni-Government to release five Britons and an Algerian arrested in Yernen less than a week-This Intelligence Community Terrorist Threat Assessment was initiated by the Chief, DCI Counterterrorist Center, and drafted by the Central Intelligence Agency. It was coordinated by the Community Counterterrorism Board APPROVED FOR RELEASED DATE: 25-April-2012 359

	- Section 1
	carlier for allegedly planning bombings and acts of sabotage against Yemeni, US, UN and British targets in Aden.
	In December 1992 three bombs exploded outside the two hotels in Aden  US military personnel supporting Operation Restore Hope in
:	Somalia had been billeted at one of the hotels. Seven people died in the attacks, but no US citizens were injured. Yemeni authorities blamed the attack on the YII
	In addition to domestic terrorists, transnational terrorist groups—including Usama Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization—have targeted US interests in Yemen.
:	
	the US Embassy
	publicly warned US citizens in Yemen of a possible terrorist threat.
	Security Environment (U)
	Yemen has taken limited steps against terrorists within its borders but faces obstacles to undertaking more sweeping counterterrorist measures. The government does not control large areas of the country, which historically has been dominated by tribes, some of whose
	leaders sponsor foreign and indigenous Islamic extremists.
• .	
	As a result, a number foreign terrorists continue to operate in Yemen with little apparent fear of adverse government reaction.
	Yemeni Government officials have made a commitment to provide security to US personnel working in Aden, but in the aftermath of the Cole attack their initial support to
	the US team was slow and inadequate and the team is operating without clearly defined physical security standards. US officials have limited resources on their own to implement
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SECONT.	
Threat to US Personnel (U)	J
Even as US and Yemeni authorities take steps to enhance security, the opportunities for deliberate attacks against US personnel are increasing.	
international media is certain to raise the team's profile with the local population and	
terrorise groups,	7
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	Even as US and Yemeni authorities take steps to enhance security, the opportunities for deliberate attacks against US personnel are increasing.  he coverage of the ongoing investigation by local and

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	Intelligence Report
	DCI Counterterrorist Center 9 April 1999
	Islamic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organizations Extensively (U)
	Many Islamic terrorist and extremist groups
	rely on nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) for funding, and their exploitation of these organizations is likely to grow.
. •	<ul> <li>NGOs also provide an easily exploitable international network for logistics support, which for many terrorists is more valuable than the funds they may receive through NGOs.</li> </ul>
	Although there are more than 6,000 Islamic NGOs and charities, only a few dozen support terrorists. Those that do generally fall into three basic categories:
	<ul> <li>Large, internationally active organizations headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries, which provide official support to the NGOs. These organizations most often are exploited by individual employees sympathetic to terrorist causes without the knowledge of the organization's leadership. The illicit activity tends to take place at local branch offices rather than at headquarters locations.</li> </ul>
	<ul> <li>Private NGOs, some of which are headquartered outside the traditional Muslim world. Several offices of these NGOs exist solely to support a militant cause,</li> <li>making them somewhat more susceptible to extremist penetration.</li> </ul>
	NGOs closely affiliated with a state sponsor of terrorism
	The availability of funds, cover, and logistics networks makes NGOs an appealing resource for terrorist groups. NGOs typically are awash in money
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	logistical support NGOs offer includes cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation, training, and, in some cases, weapons.	
	Terrorists typically penetrate NGOs by finding individual sympathizers who divert resources in support of the group, but in a few instances, entire NGO offices, including senior management positions, are staffed by extremists.	
	Most efforts by Persian Gulf states to curb terrorist use of NGOs by restricting the collection of funds within their borders have been ineffective, largely because the steps taken do not address the diversion of resources at the branch offices. Domestic popular support in the Gulf states for the work of Islamic NGOs often outweighs pressure on these governments to improve NGO accountability. Donors may be reluctant to contribute to an NGO publicly linked to terrorism in the aftermath of a specific terrorist incident, but over time these donors tend to believe such cases are rare and that their contributions are going toward the NGO's legitimate work.	
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	adopted by NGOs to provide greater headquarters oversight of local branches could deter abuse where it is growing the fastest.	
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mic Terrorists: Using Nongovernmental Organiza	tions Extensively (U)
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st nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) worldwide ted Nations, and many work with the United Nations I	
lowing natural disasters or other humanitarian crises, pr	
elter, immediate medical care, and other social services.	
ongovernmental organizations are educational or charital	
tablished by Sunni Islamic activists and typically pursue	
ovide humanitarian relief to needy communities and to s	
ey interpret it. Islamic NGOs also consider the defense of med conflicts part of their "humanitarian" duties—expla	
GOs provided support, including weapons, to the Afghai	
rces in the 1980s and 1990s, respectively.	
Despite their nongovernmental status, many Islamic N financial support from traditional Muslim government	
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to three basic categories—support terrorists.  ne first group includes the large, internationally active Noone of the Persian Gulf states that are exploited by indivextremists. These NGOs receive the political—and som their host governments. Terrorist abuse of such NGOs tanch office rather than at the organizations' headquarters ually are unwitting of the activity and willing to take corprised of the abuse.	GOs based in Saudi Arabia vidual employees with ties netimes financial—support takes place at the local s. Senior NGO leaders
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	The second type of NGO terrorists use are the private organizations—some also are headquartered in the Persian Gulf countries—that either have opened offices in areas of military conflict involving Muslims or have grown out of such conflicts. The outbreak of the Balkans conflict in the mid-1990s increased significantly the number of these organizations, as Islamic activists opened Europe-based NGOs to aid Bosnian Muslims.
	• The Pakistan-based Maktab al-Khidamat (MAK) is the premier example of this type of NGO. Established in Peshawar in 1984 by Usama Bin Ladin and Palestinian Abdallah Azzam to facilitate the travel and training of Arab volunteers to fight with the mujahidin in Afghanistan the NGO has opened new offices in at least 20 countries since the mid-1980s.
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	Finally, the third type of NGO terrorists use is one that maintains a close affiliation with a state sponsor of terrorism and often acts more as a foreign policy or
	intelligence tool of the state sponsors, particularly Iran, Sudan, and Libya.2
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•	Funding and Logistics Drive NGO Use
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	Many Islamic terrorist and extremist organizations use NGOs to fund their activities.  For many terrorists, NGOs represent a dependable, and seemingly endless, resource
	base. The popularity of the legitimate charitable work performed by most NGOs
•	ensures their staying power and ability to raise money.
•	<sup>2</sup> The US Department of State reviews states suspected of sponsoring terrorism and provides
	<sup>2</sup> The US Department of State reviews states suspected of sponsoring terrorism and provides an official list of these annually. Currently, Iran, Iraq, Sudan, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Cuba are on that list. (U)
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	Thing a grapher of NGOs offends tomorist around anotaction from resourcial financial
	Using a number of NGOs affords terrorist groups protection from potential financial disruptions, such as from the closure of any one NGO.
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	NGO also be a side large in and antended are with large in a second
	NGOs also have provided terrorist and extremist groups with logistical support, which in many cases may be more valuable than outright funding. Several Islamic
	NGOs offer terrorists cover employment, false documentation, travel facilitation,
•	training, and in some cases, weapons.
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
C05432022 Ton Secret Case Study: Bin Ladin Use of al-Haramayn Usama Bin Ladin has established close relationships with employees in several al-Haramayn offices has used these ties to divert resources to support his terrorist agenda members of Bin Ladin's organization, either planted or coopted by Bin Ladin after they began working for the NGO.

**MUST CREDIT INTELWIRE.com** ww.intelwire.com C05432022 Extremists have capitalized on the international status of many NGOs to maintain cells and secure safehavens in several countries. Most Islamic charitable NGOs are accredited with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), which gives them credentials terrorists can use to travel more freely across borders and to establish cells in new areas under the guise of pursuing a humanitarian mission. **Various Methods of Infiltrating NGOs** Terrorist groups typically exploit NGOs by establishing a close relationship with an NGO employee who sympathizes with their cause. The sympathizer then diverts NGO funds or logistics support to the terrorist group, usually in small amounts to avoid detection by NGO management.

C05432022 Ton Secret In a few cases, NGO offices are staffed almost entirely by extremists, probably the result of sympathizers convincing their colleagues to engage in the illicit activity or senior managers directing their subordinates. State sponsors increasingly have turned to private NGOs to hide their involvement in terrorism Bin Ladin apparently has created his own NGOs and planted members of his organization, al-Qa'ida, in others.

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Mixed Results in Curbing Terrorist Use of NGOs  Minimal Efforts by Donor States. Biforts by Persian Gulf states to curb NGO support to terrorists have had limited impact and are only partially enforced. Control measures adopted in the past few years  whose citizens are the major source of funding for Islamic NGOs—focus on the collection of funds within their countries only, offering no oversight of the finances once the money reaches branch offices or recipients abroad.	
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
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	Several factors work against a stronger response from host countries.
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
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	<ul> <li>Separating funding used for illicit versus legitimate activities is difficult. No method currently exists to ensure that funds collected in the Gulf states by NGOs are not diverted to terrorists or their supporters in the branch offices.</li> </ul>	J
	<ul> <li>Even if host countries controlled the donor collection process, terrorists could still use local branch offices for logistics support.</li> </ul>	
•	• The popularity of Islamic NGOs in the traditional Muslim world, with their religious and humanitarian mandates, makes strong actions a tough sell to local constituencies. Gulf state governments, in particular, may fear that efforts to control NGOs or pressure them to control themselves would be viewed by the public as limiting the organizations' ability to perform its legitimate tasks	
	Actions Against Individual Abusers a Successful Tactic. The greatest success against terrorist abuse of NGOs has come in the form of legal or official action against individuals. Such action not only disrupts temporarily the terrorists' flow of support, but the resulting negative publicity also has forced some NGOs to monitor their personnel more closely to avoid losing donors.	
	Closing an entire NGO branch office has proven a significant—though sometimes temporary—disruption to terrorists, forcing extremists in the vicinity to scale back their activities.	
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	<ul> <li>Unfavorable publicity concerning terrorist-ridden local branches or individual extremists employed by NGOs could persuade NGO headquarters' elements to improve their oversight of employment and travel documentation and the accountability of funds. Moreover, donor or host nations could take advantage of</li> </ul>	
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<ol> <li>Daniel Benjamin, Director for Counterterrorism</li> <li>The Honorable Samuel R. Berger, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</li> <li>Antony Blinken, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for European Affairs</li> <li>Richard A. Clarke, Special Assistant to the President and National Coordinator for Security Infrastructure Protection and Counterterrorism</li> <li>Major General Donald Kerrick, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs</li> <li>Bruce Riedel, Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Near East and South Asian Affairs</li> <li>James Steinberg, Deputy Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs ice of the Vice President</li> <li>Leon Fuerth, Assistant to the Vice President for National Security Affairs</li> </ol>	1 - David Welch, Senior	Deputy Assistan	t Secretary, Near	Eastern Affai	rs
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
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1 - MGEN John P. Casciano, Assistant Chief of Staff, Air F	orce Intelligence
1 - BGEN Richard Comer. Denuty Assistant Secretary Miss	
I - VADM Scott Pry, Director, J-3 Operations	
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- Keith Hall, Director, National Reconnaissance Office	
<ul> <li>LTG Patrick M. Hughes, Director, Defense Intelligence A</li> <li>RADM Lowell E. Jacoby, Director, Naval Intelligence</li> </ul>	Agency
1 - Frank Jones, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Peacekeeping	
1 - Franklin D. Kramer, Assistant Secretary of Defense for In Affairs	nternational Security
I - GEN Charles C. Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Cor	ps
- MGEN John Maher, USA Deputy J-3, Joint Chiefs of St	aff
- Barry McConnell, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Africa,	
Affairs	
- GEN Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman, JCS	
- Alina Romanowski, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Near	Eastern and South
Asian Affairs	
- Brian E. Sheridan, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary,	Special Operations
and Low Intensity Conflict	- •
- Walter Slocombe, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy	
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	I - RADM Thomas Wilson, Dir Federal Bureau of Investigation	ector of Intelli	gence, Joint S	taff (J2)		
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	I - Dale Watson, Deputy Assista	ent Director for	Terrorism			
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DCI UBLUPDATE 32 November 1999

APPROVED FOR RELEASE DATE: 25-April-2012


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
Masood

→ Promising initial locational reporting

→ ALEC Station's locational reporting will no/no longer be singlethreaded

TOP SECRET





 Some Taliban reportedly contemplating how to effect his departure

## **→** Assessment:

- As long as Mullah Umar holds on to power, Bin Ladin is most likely to stay in Afghanistan
- Once Bin Ladin leaves Aighanistan; his moratorium on terrorist strikes will be moot.

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	Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target	
	Usama Bin Ladin's financial assets are difficult to track bed variety of mechanisms to move and raise money. By using a traditional banks, money couriers, underground bankers—lealers—and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to traditizes on a large, difficult-to-identify network with few penetration.	a combination of known as hawala ransfer funds, he
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	Pursuing the Bin Ladin Financial Target
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	Usama Bin Ladin's finances have become increasingly difficult to track since he moved to Afghanistan in 1996, and al-Qa'ida began shifting its financial activities underground. The shift was due in large part to the organization's increased need for security following the US Embassy bombings, its reluctance to rely on Afghanistan's rudimentary banking system, and a more cautious approach to operating businesses following Bin Ladin's abrupt departure from Sudan—where he reportedly was forced to liquidate most of his assets at a loss. Because it is now difficult to attribute directly any business holding or bank account to Bin Ladin or his organization, we focus on identifying the key players, his funds, and the mechanisms he uses to move them. In addition, the international community specifically targeted Bin Ladin's finances late last year by passing United Nations Security Council Resolution 1333 which calls on all members states to freeze any funds associated with al-Qa'ida. This likely will cause Bin Ladin and his associates to be even more discreet with their financial practices.  Tracking Bin Ladin's Funds - A Moving Target  Bin Ladin's extensive financial network uses a number of mechanisms to transfer the
	funds necessary to conduct al-Oa'ida's activities. Among these are
•	underground bankers known as hawala dealers, money couriers, and financial lieutenants who oversee financial transfers, open bank accounts, and ensure that funds arrive at their appropriate destination. In addition, numerous supporters and sympathizers of al-Qa'ida take advantage of their positions with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and charitable organizations to secretly divert funds to Bin Ladin and his associates without the knowledge of senior NGO officials. The wide-ranging mechanisms used to transfer funds are difficult to track
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
Financial Lieutenants. Bin Ladin makes the final decision on how fur he entrusts key lieutenants with various aspects of his financial network fundraising, investing, and funding transfers	
fundraising, investing, and funding transfers	
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Ladin. By using these trusted individuals, Bin Ladin is able to distance name from the source of the funds, further complicating our ability to tr	
NGOs. Terrorist funds that flow through NGOs are hard to track because	
of the money moving through the NGOs is for legitimate humanitarian a	needs
The funds ea humanitarian purposes are co-mingled with those slated for nefarious pu	meds marked for rposes, making
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	Sources of Financial Support for Bin Ladin	
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	NGOs, Saudi citizens, and sympathetic donors raise funds for Bin Ladin at the	•
	grassroots level	
	Inventor onto company in 1	
	Investments, commercial activities, and drug trafficking also provide Bin Ladin with a flow of funds	
	, and reside, and drug trappeding uses provide sea season was a rion of runos	
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	NGOs. Bin Ladin associates and supporters use the fundraising capabilities of a number	
•	of NGOs to collect donations for Bin Ladin and his organization.	
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	Sympathetic Donors. Bin Ladin has a vast network of sympathizers who provide his organization with financial support.	
	organization with financial support.	
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	• We do not have enough information to quantify ac	ocurately the value of Bin Ladin's
	assets	
	We do not know the level of financial support that	t Bin Ladin draws from family
	the Saudi Governi	ment froze Bin Ladin's bank
	accounts in the Kingdom and his interest in his far	mily's construction business.
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Van Fin lines (II)					
Key Findings (U)	individuals in the Arabian Peninsula and grassroots	supporter	wealthy rs from arour	nd	
	individuals in the Arabian Peninsula and grassroots the world are critical funding sources for al-Qa'ida.				
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	Identifying Al-Qa'ida's Donors and Fundraisers: A Status Report		
		Dance Hand Danks and Postitution	
		Donors Use of Fundraisers and Facilitators  Donors generally channel money intended for terrorist-related activities through middlemen—including nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), mosques, fundraisers, and businessmen—rather than giving the funds directly to Bin Ladin or other senior al-Qa'ida members. This practice hides the donors' role and allows them to deny knowing funds went to terrorists.	
This as	sessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrents and queries are welcome	orist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.	
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		Mosques.  terrorist groups receive funding and logistical support from Islamic
		clergy (imams) and other personnel at mosques.
		mosques and Islamic cultural centers with radical members sent donations to extremist groups
	Charity: The Third Pillar of Islam (U)	
	Charity is one of the principal duties of all Muslims as stated in the Quran. Alms-giving is divided into the obligatory (zakat) and the voluntary (sadaqa), but the distinction is not always maintained. Zakat is a religiously mandated charitable obligation on all Muslims.	
	A LA VIVE SALES AND THE SALES	
		collecting money from a mix of small and large personal and corporate donations and giving the money to couriers for delivery.
	Sadaqa, unlike Zakat, is a voluntary donation made to anyone at any time of the year in any amount. In Arabic, Sadaqa means "charity."	
•	Devout Muslims give their contributions directly to Islamic organizations and needy individuals or, in some countries, to a government-run fund, which organizes the collection and distribution of charitable donations.	
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DATE: 25-April-2012

## Bombings in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam - An Update

#### Overview of Today's Briefing

- Status of the Investigation
- Usama Bin Ladin as a Worldwide Threat
- Probable Reaction to a Strike Against Usama Bin Ladin at Khowst

#### Nairobi and Dar es Salaam Bombings

Status of the Investigation

#### Leads Point to Usama Bin Ladin and Associates

• All credible intelligence links bombings to prime suspects: Bin Ladin and the Egyptian groups al-Jihad and al-Gama'at al-Islamiyya

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Bin Ladin sponsored bombings

reportedly planning to bomb embassies in Nairobi and Dar es Salaam

Man injured in Nairobi blast appears linked to
 Bin Ladin

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#### Usama Bin Ladin

Worldwide Terrorist Threat

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#### **Promoting Universal Jihad**

- Goal of Worldwide Islamic government
- Strategy:
  - "Liberate" Saudi Arabia and Palestine
  - Fight against "dictators"
  - Promote unity among extremist groups
- Formed "International Front for Jihad Against the Jews and Crusaders"

### Ties to Extremists and Presence Worldwide

- North and Sub-Saharan Africa
- · Yemeni, Saudi, Omani
- Jordanian, Lebanese, Palestinian, Syrian
- Southeast Asia
- Mujahedin groups in Bosnia, Chechnya, Tajikistan, Kashmir, Kosovo
- North America and Europe

#### Bin Ladin: Links to Terrorism

- World Trade Center, Manila Air, OPM/SANG
- · Attacks on US in Somalia and Yemen
- Assassination attempts
- Less destructive attacks in

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#### Bin Ladin: Casts US as Enemy

- Bin Ladin blames United States for Muslim problems
- Declared war on the US in 1996
  - Decreed in February 1998 that Muslims kill Americans and their allies, including civilians
  - Promised results of this declaration "within weeks" in May 1998

# Probable Reaction to Strike Against Usama Bin Ladin in Khowst

#### Some Form of Retaliation Virtually Assured

- Retaliatory attack by supporters almost a certainty
- Anti-US violence in Pakistan likely
- Follow-on actions by Bin Ladin's organization still possible
- Exact response based on whether Bin Ladin, senior colleagues, leaders of other groups, and families are killed

#### Strike at Khowst May Affect Bin Ladin's Allies

- Broad range of nationalities train at the camps
- A number of Islamic extremists likely present at the sites

## Factors Affecting the Timing and Targets for Retaliation

- Disruptive effect of Bin Ladin's death or capture in the operation
- Emergence of a strong replacement from among his followers
- Effectiveness of separate effort to neutralize his worldwide network

## Post-Bin Ladin Splits Still Pose Dangers to the US


- Less likely, but Bin Ladin's organization could break into factions
- Lack of central authority could cause some factions to retaliate quickly
- US official presence and civilians at risk worldwide, but especially in Arabian Peninsula and Pakistan

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AGAINST THE U.S. MILITARY IN SAUDI ARABIA.

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
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
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	4 December 1998
	SUBJECT: Bin Ladin Preparing To Hijack US Aircraft and Other Attacks
	Reporting suggests Bin Ladin and his allies are preparing for attacks in the US, including an aircraft hijacking to obtain the release of Shaykh 'Umar 'Abd al-Rahman, Ramzi Yousef, and Muhammad Sadiq 'Awda. One source quoted a senior member of the Gama' at al-Islamiyya (IG) saying that, as of late October, the IG had completed planning for an operation in the US on behalf of Bin Ladin, but that the operation was on hold. A senior Bin Ladin operative from Sandi Arabia was to visit IG counterparts in the US soon thereafter to discuss options—perhaps including an aircraft hijacking.
	IG leader Islambuli in late September was planning to hijack a US airliner during the "next couple of weeks" to free 'Abd al-Rahman and the other prisoners, according to what may be a different source.
	The same source late last month said that Bin Ladin might implement plans to hijack US aircraft before the beginning of Ramadan on 20 December and that two members of the operational team had evaded security checks during a recent trial run at an unidentified New York airport
	2. Some members of the Bin Ladin network have received hijack training, according to various sources, but no group directly tied to Bin Ladin's al-Qa'ida organization has ever carried out an aircraft hijacking. Bin Ladin could be weighing other types of operations against US aircraft. According to the IG in October obtained SA-7 missiles and intended to move them from Yemen into Saudi Arabia to shoot down an Egyptian plane or, if unsuccessful, a US military or civilian aircraft.
	in October told to that unspecified "extremist elements" in Yemen had acquired SA-7s
	3. indicate the Bin Ladin organization or its allies are moving closer to implementing anti-US attacks at unspecified locations, but we do not know whether they are related to attacks on aircraft. A Bin Ladin associate in Sudan late last month told a colleague in Kandahar that he had shipped a group of containers to Afghanistan. Bin Ladin associates also talked about the movement of containers to Afghanistan before the East Africa bombings.
	In other Bin Ladin associates last month discussed picking up a package in Malaysia. One told his colleague in Malaysia that "they" were in the "ninth month [of pregnancy]."
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	This memorandum was prepared by pf the DCI Counterterrorist Center. The anthor can be reached

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TERRORISM: INCORPORATION OF AYMAN  ZAWAHIRI'S AL-JIHAD ORGANIZATION INTO USAMA BIN LADIN'S  AL-QA'IDA; RECENT ACTIVITIES OF EGYPTIAN ASSOCIATES OF  AL-QA'IDA	_ ·	
SHORTAGE OF FUNDS.  ZAWAHIRI RELY		
INCREASINGLY ON FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE FROM USAMA ((BIN LADIN)), WHICH HAS RESULTED, FOR PRACTICAL PURPOSES, IN THE INCORPORATION OF ELI INTO AL-OA'IDA		
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
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	Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks		
	Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan	•	
· ·			
Summary (U)	Pakistani militant groups, with al-Oa'ida and Taliba planning attacks	in assistance, are	I
	plaining attacks		
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	threatened to attack US commercial facilities, as well as US citizens in Pal	diplomatic and	
• . •	press reports.	ristan, according to	
	Usama Bin Ladin is strongly encouraging these attac	cks. Since his return to	•
•	Usama Bin Ladin is strongly encouraging these attac Afghanistan in 1996, Bin Ladin has forged close ties militant groups, particularly those with connections	to several Pakistani	
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C05375521 Terrorism: Extremists Planning Attacks Against US Interests in Pakistan Increasing Terrorist Threats Several Pakistani militant groups, with al-Qa'ida and Taliban assistance, are planning attacks Arab extremists based in Afghanistan also may be planning attacks This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis and the Office of Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Analysis. Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed

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	threatening to attack US	
	hreatening to attack US civilian, diplomatic, and commercial interests in Pakistan	
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Γ	Bin Ladin, Taliban Strongly Encourage Attacks  Bin Ladin, who has close ties to several Pakistani militant groups is strongly encouraging the anti-US attacks.	
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	Islamabad has taken a number of steps since  Il September to bolster domestic stability and limit the influence of radical militant groups.	
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	Appendix B		<i>:</i> .
	Long-standing Pakistani Militant Ties To Bin Ladin		
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	The Kashmiri militant groups	<ul> <li>The militant groups also find common cause with Bin Ladin and the Taliban through their struggle to wrest control of Kashmir from India, which fits into</li> </ul>	
	longstanding tles to Usama Bin Ladin.	the global Islamic jihad espoused by Bin Ladin.	
	close association with the Taliban in neighboring		
	Afghanistan set the stage for Bin Ladin to link up	Training. When the Taliban came to power in Afghanistan in 1996, it took control of militant	
		training camps in the country and provided increased access	•
		access,	
	relationship deepened after the Taliban came to power and Bin Ladin moved to	Usama Bin Ladin to direct the activities at many of	
	Afghanistan	the facilities. militants trained at Bin Ladin-run camps in Afghanistan	
	Nature of the Links	as one production of the control of	
	The ties between the militant groups and Bin Ladin include ideological affinity, rhetorical support, shared		
	training facilities	<ul> <li>Instruction at the camps includes basic training in the handling of light weapons and grenades, more</li> </ul>	
	Ideology. A common adherence to an extremist	advanced work with heavier weapons, and terrorism	
	understanding	techniques	
•	creation of an Islamic		
	theocracy governed by <i>sharia</i> law and administered by Muslim clerics, or <i>ulema</i> —is the most basic tie		•
•	by Muslim ciencs, of <i>thema</i> —is the most basic tie		
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•	DCI Counterterrorist Center	27 March 2001
# # #	Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terro	rism
1	Afghanistan plays a key role in harboring, training, and sponterrorists, including Usama Bin Ladin. The country's Talibato Islamic extremist causes—allow more than two dozen train their territory and provide logistics support to members of varorganizations and mujahidin engaged in jihads in a variety of Chechnya and Kashmir.  The camps provide an opportunity for Islamic militants to ideological, logistical, and personal ties with colleagues as	n leaders—sympathetic iing camps to operate in ious terrorist of locations, including forge long-lasting
	We estimate that mujahidin have received training in Afghanistan since 1979. The current	
	include religious indoctrination and instruction in the use of s guerrilla tactics	
•	some camps prov	ide instruction in
	special tactics for carrying out terrorist operations, including	
		•
-	The nurturing of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan has interi In the past two years, terrorist plots in North America, Europe Asia link back to Afghanistan. Militants who receive training	e, the Middle East, and there often are sent
	afterwards to fight in jibads When resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they confirm of manpower for terrorist operations.	they return home to onstitute a ready supply
<b>3</b>	resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they coof manpower for terrorist operations.  • Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities.	onstitute a ready supply environment to e would be hard-
**	resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they coof manpower for terrorist operations.  • Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating	onstitute a ready supply environment to e would be hard-
**	resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they confirmed of manpower for terrorist operations.  • Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities. He pressed to find another location offering the same security	onstitute a ready supply environment to e would be hard- and freedom of action.
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**	resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they confirmed for terrorist operations.  • Afghanistan provides Bin Ladin a relatively safe operating oversee his organization's worldwide terrorist activities. He pressed to find another location offering the same security  This Intelligence Report was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center and	onstitute a ready supply environment to le would be hard- and freedom of action.  d the Office of Near Eastern,
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	Afghanistan: An Incubator for International Terr	rorism
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	special tactics for carrying out terrorist operations, includin	
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	The nurturing of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan has inte In the past two years, terrorist plots in North America, Euro	pe, the Middle East, and
	Asia link back to Afghanistan. Militants who receive training afterwards to fight in jihads Whe resume their normal lives or migrate to other countries, they of manpower for terrorist operations.	n they return home to
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The Taliban will support terrorist groups in Afghanistan as long as it is dominate Mullah Omar's more hardline faction and locked in a struggle to gain control of territory still in Northern Alliance hands. The Taliban is not likely to succumb to	the
international pressure to alter its policy, given the limited leverage outsiders can bring to bear.	
Pakistan—as the Taliban's principal foreign patron—would appear to have to most influence over the Taliban but would face a domestic backlash and logis hurdles if it tried to apply significant pressure on the Taliban.	
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Origins of Afghanistan's Terrorist Links	
1980s and its aftermath. Muslims from around the world participated in the anti-Soresistance, created an infrastructure to support the insurgency, and helped lay the groundwork for Afghanistan's continuing role as a training ground for mujahidin involved in terrorist groups and in later jihads' in other locations. Much of the infrastructure, including the training camps, remained after the Soviet withdrawal, buttressed by the presence of a large cadre of war veterans well versed in guerrilla actics and willing to pass on their experiences and skills.	
Afghanistan—at the crossroads of the Middle East, South Asia, and Central Asia is close to much of the Islamic world and is a convenient location for militants to train for operations planned in other countries. Afghanistan's mountainous terra moreover, provides a natural defense against law enforcement and counterterrori actions.	in,
Political instability and civil war in Afghanistan following the fall of the Communist Government in 1992 contributed to the favorable environment for terrorist-related ctivities. Even before the Taliban emerged, some Afghan leaders provided logistic upport to the Islamic militants who helped them lefeat the Soviets; others provided more significant assistance because it was inancially profitable and boosted their Islamic and leadership credentials.	
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, for example, promoted militant training in camps under his control as a way to establish himself	
Jihad: Literally, holy war; used to designate either a war against unbelievers or a personal ruggle to overcome one's imperfections. Extremists tend to broaden the concept of unbeliever, stifying terrorist violence as a jihad against anything or anyone perceived as anti-Islamic. (U)	ر
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	Another warlord, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, oversaw training operations	•	i
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	Terrorist Activities in Afghanistan Today		
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	The Taliban's origins, composition, and brand of highly orthodox Islam predispose the		
	group to supporting worldwide Islamic extremist causes. The Taliban's senior leaders, including Mullah Omar and most of his close subordinates, are former mujahidin from	1	
	the war against the Soviet Union and staunchly support the concept of jihad. They even	[	
	refer to the ongoing Afghan civil war as such, notwithstanding that the Taliban's opposition is composed largely of fellow Sunni Muslims.		
	To fight its own sivil was the Telihan relies heavily on faming model it.		
	• To fight its own civil war, the Taliban relies heavily on foreign mujahidin from camps in Afghanistan as well as Pakistani and Afghan students recruited directly		
	from Pakistan's religious schools—some of which are widely regarded as breeding	1	٠.
•	grounds for Islamic militancy.		
	Training Camps (U)		
	A wide variety of reporting indicates that over two dozen training camps exist in	1	
	Afghanistar The common worlds instruction in william and		
	The camps provide instruction in military and terrorist tactics and religious indoctrination. The graduates often go directly to fight in		
	the Afghan war or to jihads in Kashmir, Chechnya, or elsewhere before returning to		
	their own countries, where many await instructions for participation in terrorist operations, according to multiple sources.		
•			
	<ul> <li>The camps form the foundation of the worldwide mujahidin network by allowing</li> <li>Islamic militants from diverse locations to forge longstanding ideological, logistical,</li> </ul>		
•	and personal ties	1	
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**	received training in Afghan camps since 1979.	ŀ	
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•	An estimated 15,000 to 20,000 fighters have trained in Bin Ladin-supported camps since Bin Ladin's return to Afghanistan in 1996	•
	Camp Financing. Financing for the camps is varied, including public and private charitable organizations, individual supporters of Islamic causes, and "tuition" paid by camp attendees, according to a variety of sources. Islamic militant groups raise money directly from wealthy donors—primarily in the Persian Gulf states and Western Europe—to support terrorist training, and they funnel money through nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)	
	suggests Bin Ladin also provides substantial funds, directly and through NGOs, to most of the training camps in Afghanistan.  Military and terrorist training.	
	receive basic training in the use of small arms and guerrilla tactics.  advanced and specialized training in subjects such as explosives	
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	In addition to military and terrorist tactics, training in the Afghan religious indoctrination. Trainers frequently use the religious trainwhose religious fervor qualifies them for more specialized terrori religious instruction includes repetition of the ideas that the Unite evil and that the regimes of Arab countries are not true believers	ining to select militants st training. The ed States and Israel are	
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	Training in nonconventional weapons. Terrorists experiment w		
	camp	In Derunta militants	
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		Afghänistan as Safehaven for Terrorists (U)
		Afghanistan has served as a place of refuge for international terrorists, such as Bin
		Ladin and his associates, since the 1980s. The Taliban aids Bin Ladin by assigning him
		guards for security  and refusing to cooperate with
•		extradition efforts
	-	
·		Mir Amal Kansi, perpetrator of the 1993 killings outside CIA headquarters, and     Ramzi Youssef, mastermind of the World Trade Center bombing, also received     safebaven in Afghanistan.
		Key Hub for Mujahidin Network (U)
•		The mujahidin network—an informal collection of fighters and support pipelines first established during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union—has continued to grow over the last two decades. The network takes advantage of lax security along Afghanistan's borders to move militants, funds, and supplies on behalf of Bin Ladin and other Islamic extremist groups. Many of these men and material are "exported" from
•		established during the Afghan war against the Soviet Union—has continued to grow over the last two decades. The network takes advantage of lax security along
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	In September 2000, hundreds of men were training in Afghanistan
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	International Repercussions of Afghanistan-Based Terrorism
	Islamic extremism nurtured in Afghanistan creates ripples throughout the world. The
	arrests in December 1999 of an Islamic extremist cell in Jordan and of an Algerian
	member of an extremist network in Canada attempting to smuggle explosives into the
	United States highlight the linkages between Afghanistan and Islamic extremist threats
	to US interests worldwide. Although both networks consisted primarily of locally-
	based extremists who lacked formal affiliations with other terrorist groups, available
	intelligence suggests that operatives of al-Qa'ida—Bin Ladin's organization
•	headquartered in Afghanistan—directed both operations, and many of the cell members
	had received training in Afghanistan.
	• the Jordan cell members, and
	particularly Khadr Abu Hawshar—an Afghan veteran who belonged to
	al-Qa'ida—were in contact with Abu Zubayda, an al-Qa'ida member involved in the
	training and movement of mujahidin into and out of Afghanistan, and Khalil Deek, a
	well-known figure in the mujahidin network based in Pakistan, who may also be a
· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	member of al-Qa'ida.
	member of al-Qa`ida.
	member of al-Qa'ida.      Ahmed Ressam—a former Montreal resident who tried to smuggle over 100 pounds
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C05375516 Top Secret The Algerian and Egyptian Islamic extremist movements have benefited from the leadership and military skills acquired by some of their members in Afghanistan.


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	Narcotics Network Supports Extremist Activities
	The Taliban, Bin Ladin, and other extremist groups benefit from the narcotics network in Afghanistan.  the Taliban earns substantial revenue from taxing opium poppy cultivation, licensing drug labs, and collecting fees for drug shipments. In many cases the Taliban facilitates drug trafficking and receives payment
	Bin Ladin has taken advantage of the situation in Afghanistan to encourage the Taliban and drug barons to increase narcotics output and expand trafficking activities to support his war against. Western interests. Bin Ladin also has encouraged associated extremist groups to traffic in narcotics to support their causes and operations.
	Bin Ladin participates in a range of legitimate and illicit business activities and encourages affiliated extremist groups and the Taliban to finance their activities in a similar manner, thereby reducing the financial burden on his organization.
	Afghan traffickers may view Bin Ladin's support as a religious and political justification for their involvement in the narcotics trade.
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'4	• The Taliban, Bin Ladin, and regional traffickers often use the same networks of
	regional moneychangers to conduct international financial transactions—the Taliban, to circumvent international sanctions; Bin Ladin, to support his terrorist apparatus; and the traffickers, to launder the proceeds of drug sales
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in Pakistan an and Banglade	nd other parts of S sh signed Bin La	South Asia. Lea din's 1998 anti-	ders of three extr US fatwa, public	n sentiment and activitie remist groups in Pakista ly declaring their
intention to re	taliate for any U	S attack on Bin	Ladin.	
	esident Clinton's		•	ngladesh, and Pakistan ktremists were targeting
	ervor in Pakistan Center in Islama			the US Embassy and acks.
Bleak prospec		ital change <del>in</del> T	aliban policy. T	he Taliban gives every
Bleak prosper indication of c reporting high	cts for fundament continuing to sup	ntal change in T port terrorist gro aliban's fortunes	aliban policy. To oups in Afghanist on the battlefield	he Taliban gives every
Bleak prosper indication of creporting high group's depen  The Taliba effort by a	cts for fundament continuing to sup- dights that the Ta dence on Bin La	port terrorist group diban's fortunes din's al-Qa'ida o	bups in Afghanist on the battlefield organization.  Is more in terms of ate within its terms of a series of a seri	he Taliban gives everyan. Intelligence I have an impact on the of support for the war itory than it loses from
Bleak prosper indication of oreporting high group's depen  The Taliba effort by a internation  Even if the Afghanists continued has had on probably be	cts for fundament continuing to supplights that the Taidence on Bin Ladian probably calculations and a Taliban were to an stay in Afghanist the Taliban's absecome an import	port terrorist group diban's fortunes din's al-Qa'ida din's al-Qa'ida diates that it gain terrorists to oper the absence of it successfully contant despite the nility to gain integrant provider of	bups in Afghanist on the battlefield organization.  Is more in terms of ate within its termiternational recomplete its militare mar is firmly coregative impact the mational recognitional recognition infrastructure and	he Taliban gives everyan. Intelligence I have an impact on the of support for the war itory than it loses from guition.


	returned would benefit Bin Ladin and other Islamic extremists in the country. At least two of the warlords, Sayyaf and Hikmatyar—the most extreme Islamists among the factional leaders—operated terrorist camps before the Taliban came into existence and probably would try to court Bin Ladin to gain an edge in the struggle for ascendancy.
	Factors that might cause the Taliban to reduce support to terrorism. The Taliban
	might, at least temporarily, temper its support for terrorism-for example, by closing
	down some of the training camps
	in two independent scenarios:
	The Taliban consolidates control over the rest of the country.
	The Taliban may expect a military victory would bring them closer to
	international recognition and reconstruction aid, concluding that some anti-terrorism
	measures could make a difference with the international community.
	The Taliban's leadership dynamic changes.
a contract of the contract of	Leverage Over the Taliban is Limited
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	The Taliban's stomach for enduring the consequences of international and bilateral
	The Taliban's stomach for enduring the consequences of international and bilateral sanctions makes applying effective pressure difficult. A variety of reporting indicates
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	Pakistan's longstanding financial, logistical, and operational support for the Taliban, as	}
1	well its diplomatic recognition of the group, gives it potential leverage over the group.	]
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	Pakistan faces significant hurdles in maintaining pressure on the Taliban.	
	The porous nature of Afghanistan's borders pose a serious logistical challenge.	
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•	The Taliban also has supporters	
· ·	who would work to undermine punitive measures against the Taliban.	
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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY



DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE

14 November 2002

## Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations

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	Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist	
	Organizations	
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Key Findings (U)	Saudi Arabia is a key base of financial support for al-Qa'ida	]
	Most of the money originates from wealthy	J
•	individuals, fundraisers who solicit smaller donations, and diversions from	
	non-governmental organizations (NGOs); a portion of the funding is	
• ,	derived from legitimate religious contributions.	•
	Saudi Arabia for the bulk of its	
	fundraising for several years	
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_	Since 9/11, Riyadh has responded to a number of US requests to staunch	•
	the flow of funds	
	hese actions, coupled with	
'	donors' fears of US and international actions, have led to a drop in money	
	flowing from Saudi Arabia to al-Qa'ida	•
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
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	agency—ov	ersees Saudi ban	rai bank and cmei ks efforts' to freeze	f financial enforceme e and seize terrorist-	ent linked
	assets.				
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	Sandi Based Winematal Command	
	Saudi-Based Financial Support for Terrorist Organizations	
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	A Major Source of Terrorist Funds	
	consider Saudi Arabia a key base of financial support.	1 1
	Most of the money	
•	originates from wealthy individuals, fundraisers who	
	solicit smaller donations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).	
	Organizacións (14008).	
	• The Kingdom has a conservative and-by	
	developing country standards—an affluent populace	
	inclined to bestow large grants on Islamic missionary groups to fulfill their religious	
	obligation to contribute to charity and the	
	propagation of Islam.	
	• As a result, a portion of the income that al-Qa'ida	
•	and other groups count on is derived from	
	legitimate religious contributions, where the donor	
	is either unwitting, misled, or inclined to look the other way.	
	ouler way.	
	financiers, however, knowingly	}
	donate funds to al-Qa'ida and are witting that the	
	money finances terrorist activity	
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	This assessment was prepared by the DCI Counterterrorist Center's Office of Terrorism Analysis.	
	Comments and queries are welcome and may be directed to	
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	Key Financial Base for Al-Qa'ida			
	Bin Ladin's network  Arabia for the bulk of its fundraising for years	Saudi several		
	years			
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
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		Non-Governmental O	rganizations (NGOs) and	
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		several Islamic NGOs, funds	using them to raise and move	
			several Saudi-	
		based NGOs that al-Qa	uida has been able to exploit by	
		al-Qa'ida.	gitimate activities to finance	
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
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	requests to staunch the flow of funds to terrorists from the Kingdom.	1			
	these actions, coupled with donors' fears of US and international				
	actions, have led to a drop in money flowing from Saudi Arabia to al-Qa'ida				
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	Collecting against or banks and NGOs will donors and crippling supporting al-Qa'ida	also be critical to the financial netw	identifying orks						
	supporting al-Qa'ida	]							
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